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Since the encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII at the end of the nineteenth century, the Catholic 
Church has increasingly paid attention to social issues with its tradition of Catholic social 
teaching. Through encyclicals and other documents that address a variety of problems such as 
poverty, injustices, violations of human dignity, and degraded ecosystems, the Church involves 
herself in the mission of protecting and promoting the human dignity and the integral 
development of all human beings. Contemplating the suffering of all human beings around the 
world, the Church opens her heart to listen to the cries not only of Catholic believers but also 
of the whole human family. Gaudium et Spes remarks that “the joys and the hopes, the griefs 
and the anxieties of the men of this age, especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted, 
these are the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ.”1 
Unfortunately, due to the complicated sociopolitical situation and the particular focus 
of moral formation, Catholic social teaching is neglected in the program of theological 
formation both in seminaries and schools of theology of religious institutions in Vietnam. 
Moral formation in the Vietnamese Church focuses more on helping future priests acquire the 
necessary skills for exercising confessional ministry or simply for solving some moral cases in 
their ministry. In other words, the focus of formation in moral theology in the Vietnamese 
Church still reflects an individualistic, act-oriented approach that dominated before the Vatican 
Council II. This approach neglects a social understanding of sin and fails to address social 
issues and structural injustices.  
To address social issues and to demonstrate the negative impacts that evil structures 
have on individuals, Catholic theology has developed the concept of social sin, which by some 
                                                        
1 Vatican Council II, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes 
(Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1965), no. 1. 
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authors, is primarily understood as the sum total of personal sins. It is interesting to note that 
the account of social sin emerged in the context of a local church, namely, the Latin American 
church. At the second general conference of Latin American Episcopates in Medellín, the Latin 
American bishops introduced the language of social sin into magisterial teaching. Margaret 
Pfeil notes that “the Latin American bishops did not intend to undermine the importance of 
personal agency in formal sin, but they did want to draw a closer connection between human 
sinfulness and the pervasive webs of structural injustice enveloping their countries.”2 Although 
Pope John Paul II played an important role in incorporating the concept of social sin into the 
magisterial teaching of Catholic theology, he feared that too much emphasis on the social 
dimension of sin runs the risk of losing individual moral responsibility.  
Given the above, this thesis attempts to explain how it is important for the Church to 
address social issues, especially social evils and unjust social structures, which may deform or 
distort a person’s freedom in making a moral decision. Based on contextual analysis, this thesis 
argues that an emphasis on the social dimension of sin is important and necessary in the 
Vietnamese context. Such an emphasis does not mitigate the personal dimension of sin but 
rather calls all members of the society to be aware of sinful situations for which they are partly 
responsible. 
To achieve the proposed objectives, this research employs descriptive-analytical and 
critical approaches. Concretely, the descriptive-analytical approach will be used in describing 
the theoretical principles and definitions of the theology of social sin and that of solidarity as 
well. Then, a critical analysis will be employed in elucidating the arguments from relevant 
literature on the theme. Moreover, Y-Lan Tran, a Catholic moral theologian and medical 
                                                        
2 Margaret Pfeil, “Doctrinal Implications of Magisterial Use of the Language of Social Sin,” Louvain 
Studies 27 (2002): 137. 
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doctor, reminds us that “to be relevant and meaningful, theology has to reside in the life current 
of Asia’s peoples as it helps bring the good news of Jesus’ resurrection to them.”3 With this in 
mind, to contextualize and concretize its arguments, this thesis connects the theoretical aspects 
of our research to the concrete situation of Christians in the context of Vietnam by using 
abortion in Vietnam as a case study. Therefore, besides using the Catholic moral perspective, 
this thesis will develop its arguments based on other resources that are drawn from Vietnamese 
tradition and cultures. Finally, given our goal, the thesis also uses the results of other 
disciplines, especially social analysis and medical studies related to our case study. 
In order to answer the issues posed above, this thesis is divided into three chapters. 
Chapter One presents abortion in Vietnam as a case study setting a context for our discussion, 
focusing especially to investigate the ethical view regarding the fetus in the Vietnamese 
context. Then, the chapter makes an ethical evaluation of this case study in light of the teaching 
of the Catholic Church. Finally, the last part of the chapter discusses to what extent a moral 
agent is responsible for his or her moral acts that are done under an errant conscience. 
Chapter Two will begin with a brief historical survey of the notion of social sin in 
Christian theology. Then, it will investigate the understanding of social sin in both the theology 
of John Paul II and liberation theology and explain how some structures cause evil. Finally, 
the chapter presents how sexism, collective culture, and unjust laws all violate human dignity, 
limit and violate human freedom, and distort the capacity of a moral agent to make a good 
moral judgment. 
Chapter Three will present solidarity as a good way by which we are able to respond to 
social sins and unjust structures. To do so, this chapter first investigates the key elements of 
                                                        
3 Y-Lan Tran, “Vietnam in Transition: Theological and Ethical Challenges,” in Transformative 
Theological Ethics: East Asian Contexts, ed. Agnes M. Brazal (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila 
University Press, 2010), 43. 
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the Catholic ethic of solidarity. Then, it searches for a comprehensive account of the virtue of 
solidarity, noticing especially how one’s cultivation of solidarity can transform the society 
which one inhabits. After that, it explains the relationship between the virtue of solidarity and 
the structure of sin and, in a more particular way, how the practice of solidarity addresses the 
social problems in our specific research on abortion. Finally, some practical and pastoral 
implications will be drawn as a result of our discussion. 
 
Chapter 1: MENSTRUAL REGULATION OR ABORTION? AN ETHICAL EVALUA-
TION OF ABORTION IN VIETNAM 
1. Menstrual regulation or abortion? 
a. A brief overview of the population control concerns and legislation  
In this chapter, to set a context for our discussion it is important to figure out the 
development of laws and policies regarding abortion services and family planning in Vietnam 
from its independence in 1945 and onwards. Traditionally, in Vietnam, abortion was con-
sidered an immoral action and forbidden by law. However, this tradition was changed in 1945 
when, along with gaining independence, abortion was legalized in Vietnam.4 The Law on 
Marriage and Family was adopted in the 1960s. In the same year, by realizing difficulties due 
to a large and growing population and its pressures on the land and other resources of the 
country, the Government of North Vietnam decided to introduce a population policy. With this 
new policy, each family has to limit its size to two or three children. In order to implement this 
                                                        
4 See Tine Gammeltoft, “Between ‘Science’ and ‘Superstition’: Moral Perceptions of Induced 
Abortion Among Young Adults in Vietnam,” Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 26 (2001), 316. 
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policy, a fine, which was an average of a monthly salary, was introduced and commonly 
enforced.  
Following the reunification of North and South Vietnam in 1975, the government 
expanded family planning services in the south, where fertility rates had been higher than in 
the north due to the influence of the pronatalist policies enforced by the French and by the 
Catholic regime.5 After 1979, the Government reconfirmed the importance of the family 
planning program as part of the national population policy. In 1988, with the establishment of 
the National Council of Population and Family Planning, the government strongly 
implemented a population policy which called for each family to have a maximum of two 
children. Along with this policy, on the one hand, the government provided free contraceptives, 
abortion services, and cash incentives for sterilization; on the other hand, it also used many 
kinds of campaigns to convince people that having one or two children meant that their family 
would be happier and have a higher quality of life. Regarding abortion, two categories of pre-
gnancy termination are available: Menstrual regulation refers to a suction procedure performed 
within five weeks of conception, whereas abortion refers to all other procedures performed 
after this period.6 Long and his colleagues note that many couples increasingly viewed abortion 
as a method of contraception. He contends that the availability and easy access to abortion was 
a key factor in reaching family planning and population targets.7 For this reason, it is 
noteworthy that abortion was believed to have been adopted as an alternative to contraception.8 
                                                        
5 See Teerawichitchainan Bussarawan and Sajeda Amin, “The Role of Abortion in the Last Stage of 
Fertility Decline in Vietnam,” International Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health 36, no. 
2 (2010), 81. 
6 See ibid. 
7 See Lynellyn D. Long et al., “Changing Gender Relations in Vietnam's Post Doi Moi Era,” Policy 
Research Report on Gender and Development Working Paper Series, no. 14 (2000), 22. 
8 See Bussarawan and Amin, “The Role of Abortion in the Last Stage of Fertility Decline in 
Vietnam,” 80-89. 
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In the late 1990s, government policy shifted from birth control to reproductive health. 
Bang and others note that the new focus on reproductive health also was present in the Vietnam 
Population Strategy 2001-2010 that meant a relaxation of the former one-to-two-child policy.9 
However, due to a slight increase of fertility in 2005, the government reintroduced the former 
two-child policy to address control population increase. It also introduced fines for government 
employees and party members who violated the policy. The two-child policy was again 
affirmed in 2008 by an ordinance amending article 10 of the Population Ordinance.10  
b. Definition of menstrual regulation 
Menstrual regulation can be a morally ambiguous term covering a range of medical 
conditions. For instance, a woman who suffers from irregular menstrual periods (i.e., 
dysfunctional uterine bleeding) can undergo treatment to regulate her periods, usually with a 
hormonal pill. In this case, menstrual regulation is morally good. But in the Vietnamese 
context, in reality, the term menstrual regulation is also used to refer to situations where the 
woman in early pregnancy does not have a menstrual period and seeks to terminate the 
pregnancy by using abortive medicine (usually RU468). In this case, the treatment is said to 
“induce the menstrual period,” but in reality, this is a euphemism for medical termination of 
an early pregnancy. This case is totally different from the treatment for irregular menstrual 
periods when no pregnancy is involved. For many Vietnamese women, menstrual regulation is 
a convenient and familiar procedure that carries fewer of the uncertainties and perceived risks 
that are associated with modern contraception and perhaps with an unwanted pregnancy. 
                                                        
9 See Pham Nguyen Bang et al., “Analysis of Socio-Political and Health Practices Influencing Sex 
Ratio at Birth in Viet Nam,” Reproductive Health Matters 16, no. 32, (2008): 176-184. 
10 See Population Ordinance 06/2003/PL-UBTVQH11 January 9, 2003 amended by the Ordinance no 
08/2008/PL-UBTVQH December 27, 2008., Decree 20/2010 ND-CP implementing the article 10 of 
the Population Ordinance. See Supplement A. 
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c. Menstrual regulation and abortion in Vietnam 
Although abortion was legalized in 1945, it was introduced and practiced widely only 
in the early 1960s in Vietnam,11 where it was available upon request.12 It is difficult to estimate 
the number of abortions in Vietnam because the government tends to hide this sensitive 
information. According to the Tuoi Tre News, nearly 40 percent of unintended pregnancies in 
Vietnam is due to failed contraception.13 Some sources confirm that the figures from local 
health agencies indicate that each year 1,400,000 abortions are performed. That includes 
500,000 among women under the age of 18.14 Moreover, health authorities estimated that about 
25 percent of abortions are unsafe in Vietnam, adding that deaths due to complications remain 
close to 13 percent of all maternal deaths.15 
Government reports also show that annually Vietnam’s public hospitals perform 
between 250,000 to 300,000 abortions. However, it is important to note that these are only 
cases that were recorded officially. The actual number is estimated to be much higher as many 
women opt for private facilities due to fear that their family might find out. Many young 
women seek a “secret abortion” because they want no one to know. In 2016, a survey conducted 
by Vietnam’s General Statistics Office revealed that 70% of the country’s “secret abortions” 
                                                        
11 See Gilda Sedgh, Stanley K. Henshaw, and Susheela Singh, “Legal Abortion Worldwide: Incidence 
and Recent Trends,” International Family Planning Perspectives 33, no. 3 (2007): 216-225. 
12 By 1989, the Law on Protection of People’s Health was approved, affirming the people’s rights to 
choose contraceptive methods. Furthermore, it states that: “Women have the rights to have an 
abortion, to receive gynecological diagnosis and treatment, and health check-up during pregnancy, 
and medical service when giving birth at health facilities.” 
13 See Tuoitrenews, “Vietnam’s Abortion Rate among World’s Highest as Contraception Fails,” 
(Sept. 2007), https://tuoitrenews.vn/news/society/20170927/vietnams-abortion-rate-among-worlds-
highest-as-contraception-fails/41775.html 
14 See Thanh Thuy, “Against Abortion, for Life: Vietnamese Catholics Mark International Women’s 
Day,” Asianews (Sept. 2012), http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Against-abortion,-for-life:-
Vietnamese-Catholics-mark-International-Women's-Day--24191.html 
15 See VnExpress, “Abortion Rate in Vietnam Highest in Asia - VnExpress International,” VnExpress 
International (Sept. 2016), https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/abortion-rate-in-vietnam-highest-in-
asia-3476746.html 
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involve teenagers aged 13 to 19.16 Public services tend to be used more by married women, 
while the country’s plethora of private clinics17 see many younger, unwed women.18 In general, 
most women seeking an abortion are girls between 18 and 25 years of age, with some having 
undergone the procedure two or three times. 
There are many reasons explaining the high abortion rate in Vietnam. As we presented 
above, some contend that this situation is a consequence of the government’s ambitious 
population policy. Others suggest that a high frequency of abortion is a result of the lack of sex 
education, especially about contraception. Sex education is practically nonexistent in many 
Vietnamese schools, and is even less frequent at home. As a result, young Vietnamese, both 
male and female, are often ignorant when it comes to sex and contraception. From a cultural 
social perspective, sexism, collectivist culture, and consumerism may have a role to play in the 
high abortion rate in this country. Before discussing more deeply how these elements might 
influence one’s decision regarding abortion in the next chapter, we need to first understand 
how the Vietnamese consider the moral status of the fetus.  
d. Moral status of the human embryo and fetus in the Vietnamese tradition 
Peter Phan remarks that, as distinct from the Chinese outlook, the traditional 
Vietnamese worldview is expressed not in philosophical works but primarily in folk songs, 
proverbs, and poems.19 This phenomenon occurs because this manner of expression reflects a 
reality that is rooted in daily experience; and all Vietnamese people, educated and uneducated 
                                                        
16 See Saigoneer, “Teenagers Account for 70% of Vietnam’s ‘Secret Abortions,’” Saigoneer.com 
(July 2016), https://saigoneer.com/saigon-health/7365-teenagers-account-for-70-of-vietnam-s-secret-
abortions.  
17 In 2003, the Minister of Health published the National Standards and Guidelines (NSGs) for 
Reproductive Health Services including a chapter on Safe Abortion.  
18 See Saigoneer, “Vietnam’s Abortion Dilemma,” Saigoneer.com (January 2016), 
https://saigoneer.com/saigon-health/6146-vietnam-s-abortion-dilemma 
19 See Peter Phan, Vietnamese–American Catholics (New York: Paulist Press, 2005), 24. 
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alike, can relate, understand, and participate in it. The cultural values of the Vietnamese 
tradition are conveyed by narratives that are very familiar to each member of this community. 
Therefore, there are not many clues showing that there is a difference in the moral status of the 
fetus at different stages of the pregnancy in Vietnam. In the Western tradition, we know that 
there are a variety of opinions depending on the perspective of culture and religion. For 
example, differing opinions occur in Christianity, in the Islamic tradition, and in Judaism.  
How do the Vietnamese think about the moral status of the embryo? Although we 
cannot trace back philosophical and theological works to articulate the Vietnamese worldview 
on the moral status of the embryo in the Vietnamese tradition, a potentially important 
anthropological contribution to ethical reflection lies in the investigation of the social processes 
through which moral norms are culturally and historically shaped. As Barry Hoffmaster puts 
it, “What needs to be understood is how morality is woven into the experiences and the lives it 
helps to constitute.”20 We hope that by critically reflecting on Vietnamese customs and 
traditions, a framework of understanding and evaluation of the ethics regarding embryos will 
emerge. 
First, in both Buddhism and Vietnamese culture there is a fundamental respect for 
living beings, especially human beings. According to these traditions, human life is a mystery. 
Therefore, in destroying human life a person acts against Heaven and Earth.21 The Vietnamese 
traditional culture condemns the woman who attempts to terminate an unwanted pregnancy 
because that is “an immoral action that is prohibited by custom and law, in the past and now 
                                                        
20 Barry Hoffmaster, “Can Ethnography Save the Life of Medical Ethics?” Social Science and 
Medicine 35 (1992), 1426. 
21 See Nguyen Trai Toan Tap, The Complete Collection of Nguyen Trai’s Writings: Book One, Liên 
Quốc Mai, Khuê Nguyễn, Hoặc Thu Kiều, collectors and translators (Ho Chi Minh City: Center of 
National Studies and literature Publishers, 1998), 655. 
 10 
also.”22 In Quoc Trieu Hinh Luật: Hình Luật Triều Lê” (Criminal Code of the Le Dynasty), a 
pregnant female culprit who was sentenced to death penalty would be permitted to live until 
giving birth and the death penalty would be delayed 100 days after giving birth (Article 23).23 
Therefore, it is evident that the life of the unborn child was treasured and protected by law. 
Further, the Vietnamese tradition holds that children are a precious treasure of the family. A 
family with many children is a sign of blessing from heaven, and infertility is not blessed.24 
Second, the Vietnamese understanding of the human embryo is expressed in a custom 
that has been practiced and rooted in traditional Vietnamese education. It is an old custom that 
that children should be educated by their parents from intrauterine life. The Vietnamese 
strongly believe that the attitudes and emotions of the parents during pregnancy could have an 
educational effect on the embryo and the fetus. In the time of pregnancy, parents often express 
their love and care for their child. When a woman becomes pregnant, the elders in the family 
advise her that she should pay attention more carefully to her behavior, that is to say, she should 
try to be meek, kind-minded, and avoid bad behaviors.25 By doing so, the parents expect their 
child to experience their love and parental caring, which in turn produces a good environment 
in which a child may grow. This custom thus expresses the parents’ respect for the embryo and 
the fetus; indeed, in a certain way, it reveals a Vietnamese belief that both the embryo and the 
fetus are a human being.  
                                                        
22 Toan Ánh, Nếp Cũ – Con Người Việt Nam, Phong Tục Cổ Truyền [Old Habits - Vietnamese People 
and Customs] (Ho Chi Minh City: Ho Chi Minh City Publisher, 1992), 35. 
23 See Nguyễn Sĩ Giác, Vũ Văn Mầu, “Quoc Trieu Hinh Luật: Hình Luật Triều Lê,” [Criminal Code 
of the Le Dynasty,] translated and transcribed by Lương Thần and Cao Nải Quang (Sài Gòn: Nguyễn 
Văn Của, Publisher, 1965), 271. 
24 Blessing is an important word in Vietnamese tradition. The Vietnamese people believe that when 
parents do good things, their children will receive good blessings as a result of their parents’ deeds. 
25 See Toan Ánh, Nếp Cũ – Con Người Việt Nam, Phong Tục Cổ Truyền, 38. 
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Third, respect for the human embryo and the fetus is expressed both in the traditional 
way of proceeding in expressing love and concern in the event of a miscarriage and also in the 
custom of praying for the dead embryo and fetus. In the case of miscarriage, the mother collects 
the “clot” and buries it. If they are Catholics, the parents continue to remember their unborn 
child in their prayer; if they are Buddhists or unbelievers,26 they usually go to a Buddhist temple 
to pray for their child. By doing so, the Buddhists hope that their child can be saved and may 
be reincarnated. Moreover, the woman usually counts her miscarried fetus among her children 
and she cites the age of the gestation as the age of this dead child. Indeed, the Vietnamese, like 
some other Asian people, count the age of the child not based on the day of birth, but from the 
day of conception. 
Finally, the research of Gammeltoft shows that while most interviewees were 
convinced that abortion was a necessary choice given the current circumstances of their lives, 
they also saw the procedure as very morally problematic.27 In contrast to Western Europe and 
the United States, in Vietnam there are no public debates on the ethical aspects of abortion. 
Conscious of this fact, Gammeltoft has done in-depth interviews with twenty-five young 
women and ten young men living in the Hanoi area. From these interviews, the author 
concluded that very few of the young men and women seemed to take abortion lightly, and the 
statement that “abortion is a sin” was repeated throughout the interviews. Many interviewed 
women felt the remorse of sinfulness in emotional, psychological, ethical, or religious ways 
because they knew that they did something wrong. The author of the interviews contends that 
there were two different views of the embryo and the fetus that co-existed among many young 
                                                        
26 It is said that Buddhism is the most popular religion in Vietnam, but in reality, many Vietnamese 
people do not understand and practice their beliefs; they simply go to a Buddhist temple to pray, and 
although there are a number of people who claim that they are atheists, in reality, many of them also 
go to the temple and pray.  
27 See Tine Gammeltoft, “Between ‘Science’ and ‘Superstition’: Moral Perceptions of Induced 
Abortion Among Young Adults in Vietnam,” Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 26 (2001), 321. 
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people. From a scientific view, the fetus was seen as belonging to the domain of nature, and an 
early abortion is, therefore, a morally neutral act. In the “social-spiritual” view, the embryo 
and fetus are a cultural being, and abortion at any stage of gestation is consequently a sin. In 
both views, late-term abortions are considered morally wrong.28 While some emphasized that 
in early pregnancy an embryo or a fetus is “nothing yet,” nearly all the young women and men 
simultaneously insisted that abortion at any stage of gestation is a sin.29  
In summary, the Vietnamese people seem to assume that an embryo is a human person 
from conception. That is to say, respect and reverence are due to the embryo from the beginning 
of life. Both the human embryo and fetus are regarded as human beings. This point of view is 
expressed through the cult, morality, and activity of Vietnamese daily life. 
2. In light of the teaching of the Catholic Church 
a. Theological and moral status of the human embryo and fetus: a review of the 
Catholic tradition and Magisterium in recent Vatican documents 
The protection of human life is one of the most important missions of the Catholic 
Church. In the course of her history, the Catholic Church has unceasingly engaged in the battle 
to protect the dignity of the human fetus. Traditionally, arguments of the Catholic Church based 
on her long tradition are rooted in Scripture, tradition, natural law, and a new understanding of 
science. In this thesis, I limit myself to present the teaching of the Catholic Church on the 
prohibition of abortion presented in recent Vatican documents, especially: The Declaration on 
Procured Abortion (1974) and Evangelium Vitae (1995). 
The absolute prohibition of abortion in the teaching of the Catholic church is based on 
two main principles: the sacredness of the human being and the understanding that the embryo 
                                                        
28 See ibid., 322. 
29 See ibid., 325. 
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is a human being from the moment of conception. In the Declaration on Procured Abortion 
we read: “The tradition of the Church has always held that human life must be protected and 
favored from the beginning, just as at the various stages of its development.”30 The Declaration 
puts it clearly that, “from the time that the ovum is fertilized, a life is begun which is neither 
that of the father nor of the mother, it is rather the life of a new human being with his own 
growth. It would never be made human if it were not human already.”31 In other words, the life 
at the beginning of conception is an autonomous individual who possesses dignity, independent 
from the father and the mother. This document strongly affirms that even if “a doubt existed 
concerning whether the fruit of conception is already a human person, it is objectively a grave 
sin to dare to risk murder.”32 The first right of the human person is life.33  
In Evangelium Vitae, John Paul II employs a traditional principle against direct killing 
of the innocent. As he clearly claims: “I confirm that the direct and voluntary killing of an 
innocent human being is always gravely immoral.”34 It is important to note that here the Pope 
wants to apply this principle to all abortions: “procured abortion is the deliberate and direct 
killing,35 by whatever means it is carried out, of a human being in the initial phase of his or her 
existence, extending from conception to birth.”36 For the Pope, the embryo and the fetus are 
always an innocent human being; therefore, to have a direct abortion is direct killing and it is 
                                                        
30 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on Procured Abortion (Vatican City: 
Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1974), 6. 
31 Ibid., 12. 
32 Ibid., 13. 
33 See ibid., 11. 
34 John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, no. 57. 
35 The direct/indirect distinction has faced extensive criticism as an inadequate formulation of the 
Church’s theological tradition. Bernard Häring maintains that the question of what is direct and what 
is indirect abortion is not settled in Catholic moral theology. He contends that the distinction between 
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ abortion sometimes results in too literal or mechanical applications. See 
Bernard Häring, “A Theological Evaluation,” in The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical 
Perspectives, ed. John T. Noonan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 136. 
36 John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, 58. 
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always gravely immoral. This principle is absolute, and so there are no reasons that may justify 
or change the moral nature of this human action. As the Pope puts it clearly, “these reasons and 
others like them, however serious and tragic, can never justify the deliberate killing of an 
innocent human being.”37  
John Paul II discusses the argument that allows abortion for the first days after 
conception because the result of conception cannot yet be considered a personal human life.38 
Responding to this argument, the Pope contends that genetic science demonstrates this life is 
human from the time of fertilization. He puts it clearly that “the results themselves of scientific 
research on the human embryo provide ‘a valuable indication’39 for discerning by the use of 
reason a personal presence at the moment of the first appearance of a human life: how could a 
human individual not be a human person?’”40 This argument is cited from number 78 of the 
Instruction on Respect for Human Life, Donum Vitae. The question indicates a tutiorist 
approach, to address a complex ethical question without the ability of moral certainty. Even in 
Roman Catholicism, there are theologians who cast doubt upon the personhood of the embryo 
during the early days of pregnancy. However, while acknowledging the lack of certainty about 
the beginning of personhood, the Catholic Magisterium has held that the human embryo must 
be treated as a person from the moment of conception.41  
Some may argue that there is no doubt that human embryos and fetuses are human. The 
issue is, rather, what moral status they have in the early stages of development. For a Catholic, 
because a human embryo is human, the embryo has the same dignity that any person holds. 
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Clearly, one of the most fundamental human rights is the right to live. This respect for moral 
dignity is derived from the understanding of the human soul. God creates a new soul and 
imparts it to the new human being; it follows that the presence of the soul42 establishes dignity; 
therefore, dignity prevents any action that violates or destroys the vitality of a developing 
human being. In sum, according to the official teaching of the Catholic Church, a new human 
being starts from the time that the ovum is fertilized and possesses the dignity of human beings 
that need to be protected; therefore, the direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being 
is always gravely immoral. 
b. A critical and ethical evaluation of menstrual regulation in Vietnam 
Although derived from different sources, the attitudes toward embryos and fetuses in 
the Vietnamese tradition and in Roman Catholic teaching reach almost the same point of view. 
As presented above, the Vietnamese tradition and culture hold that the embryo is a human 
being at the first moment of conception. This view is confirmed by the teaching of the Catholic 
Church. In order for this encounter to be fruitful for both parties we need, first of all, to raise a 
question: what can Catholic teaching offer to the Vietnamese people who are not 
predominantly Catholic? I firmly believe that what the Church addresses to Catholics, she must 
also address to those who are not Catholic. Indeed, the Gospel of life “has a profound and 
                                                        
42 The question on the moment of implantation of the soul has been discussed a lot among Catholic 
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persuasive echo in the heart of every person, believer and non-believer alike, because it 
marvelously fulfils all the heart’s expectations while infinitely surpassing them.”43 The content 
of the Gospel is defined in theological, not philosophical or scientific terms. Scripture and 
tradition provide moral principles while the natural law provides reasons for the Pope to urge 
all persons to follow these principles.44 From that point of view, I think that Catholic teaching 
should shed a light on the situation of the high rate of abortions that the Vietnamese society 
and the Church are faced with. 
As presented above, it is supported by the Vietnamese tradition and culture that 
abortion is morally wrong. It is in order to hide the true nature of abortion and to attenuate its 
seriousness in public opinion, or to avoid fostering an uneasiness of conscience,45 that people 
in Vietnam tend to use ambiguous terminology, such as “interruption of pregnancy” or 
menstrual regulation. As John Paul II stresses “no word has the power to change the reality of 
things: procured abortion is the deliberate and direct killing, by whatever means it is carried 
out, of a human being in the initial phase of his or her existence, extending from conception to 
birth.”46 As Callahan puts it: “abortion is not just an ‘emptying of the uterine contents.’ It is 
also an act of killing; there will be no abortion unless the conceptus is killed.”47  
From the analysis of the sensitive situation in Vietnam as presented above, one may 
argue that, in some cases, those who have an abortion in the first week of pregnancy can 
morally justify it because there are tragic and painful conditions for the mother, who might 
                                                        
43 John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, no. 2. 
44 See Leslie C. Griffin, “Evangelium Vitae: The Law of Abortion,” in John Paul II and Moral 
Theology, eds. Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, Readings in Moral Theology No. 10 
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45 See John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, no. 58. 
46 Ibid., no. 58. 
47 Daniel Callahan, “Abortion Decisions: Personal Morality,” in Bioethics: Principles, Issues, and 
Cases, ed. L. Vaughn (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 308. 
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be-for example-an unmarried student. Sometimes the motivation that leads to that decision is 
fear that the child to be born would live in such conditions that it would be better if the birth 
did not take place. In other words, are there some circumstances in which an abortion can be 
justified? Responding to this argument, Pope John Paul II affirms that these reasons and others 
like them, however serious and tragic, can never justify the deliberate killing of an innocent 
human being.48 In short, a direct abortion is grave and morally wrong because it is the deliberate 
and direct killing of human life.  
Finally, traditionally, the moral theology of the Catholic Church on abortion used to 
focus on the personal responsibility of those who commit this immoral act. Based on an 
individualistic and act-oriented approach, it seems to me that the Catholic Church has partly 
neglected a social understanding of sin and failed to address social issues and unjust structures. 
It is evident from our discussion that unjust policy and the lack of understanding of moral 
choice could lead many people to act against what their consciences tell them. Therefore, by 
affirming the immorality of abortion, the situation in Vietnam calls us to reflect more 
profoundly on how unjust social and cultural structures impact negatively on moral choices 
and on the development of an individual in society. In this context, I think that insights from 
the theology of social sin of the Catholic Church would help us articulate on the one hand, 
what is happening; and, on the other hand, the contextual analysis might enrich the 
understanding of social sin in the tradition of Catholic theology.  
This thesis points out that an emphasis on the social dimension of sin is important and 
necessary in the Vietnamese context and that such an emphasis does not mitigate the personal 
dimension of sin but rather calls all members of the society to be aware of sinful situations for 
which they are partly responsible. However, in order to attain this goal, it is important first to 
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articulate the concept of conscience and its role in moral theology. Indeed, despite being 
different from what is presented in the Catholic tradition, conscience plays a vital role in the 
ethical system and life in the Vietnamese tradition. As indicated above, many Vietnamese 
people feel the remorse of sinfulness when they have an abortion because they know that they 
did something against their conscience. Hence, in the next section, by explaining the concept 
of conscience and erroneous conscience, the thesis attempts to answer the questions: What does 
one should do to act in accordance with one’s conscience? How does a woman feel when she 
decides to act against what her conscience says that she should not do? And, due to negative 
impacts from society, if one does not know that abortion is an immoral act, to what extent 
people can be responsible for their acts?  
3. Conscience and moral responsibility  
a. A brief overview of conscience and its role in moral theology 
As mentioned above, the Gospel of life echoes in the heart of every person, believer 
and non-believer alike. Catholic theology confirms that all human beings are called to do good 
and avoid evil by virtue of the voice of their conscience. Conscience plays an important role in 
the history of philosophical and theological reflection. The nature of conscience has been 
discussed from antiquity and reinforced through the ages. Vatican Council II opened a new age 
for conscience by describing conscience as the person’s “most secret core, and their sanctuary,” 
and affirming that “in the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he does not impose 
upon himself, but which holds him to obedience.”49 O’Malley calls “conscience” the most 
“impressive among interiority words” used at the Council.50 Under the influence of Vatican 
                                                        
49 Vatican Council II, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes 
(Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1965), no. 16. 
50 John W. O’Malley, What Happened at Vatican II (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2010), 48-52, at 50. 
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Council II, and in the spirit of the renewal of moral theology, the stress is on the “primacy of 
conscience.” To emphasize the role of conscience, the Second Vatican Council helps the 
Church open her heart to the world. David DeCosse contends that the concept of conscience 
plays a vital role in helping the Church open herself to dialogue with the modern world. He 
affirms that  “Gaudium es spes drew on the concept of conscience as one way to establish the 
basis for the theme of the document: the dialogue between the church and the modern world.”51  
What does conscience mean? In the classical world, the Greek word syneidesis means 
“knowing with.” The term was translated in Latin as conscientia, and from that comes the 
English word “conscience,” which has two meanings. The first is “consciousness, knowledge 
of oneself,” especially “consciousness of right and wrong.” The second is “a joint knowledge 
with some other person, being privy to.”52 The moral tradition of the Catholic Church holds 
that the conscience is at the heart of moral life and, through conscience, a person can perceive 
the will of God. In Dignitatis humanae, Pope Paul VI affirms that “on his part, man perceives 
and acknowledges the imperatives of the divine law through the mediation of conscience.”53 
By listening and acting in accordance with the call of conscience, a person is responsible for 
his moral acts before God. Indeed, Keenan contends that “conscience is the source of all moral 
obligations: there we are each called by God to love and to develop ourselves so as to know 
what constitutes right living.”54 Therefore, if our consciences are well formed, we are able to 
make good moral decisions. Unfortunately, as presented above, our case study points out that 
                                                        
51 David DeCosse, “The Primacy of Conscience, Vatican II, and Pope Francis: The Opportunity to 
Renew a Tradition,” in Paul G. Crowley, ed., From Vatican II to Pope Francis: Charting a Catholic 
Future (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2014), 158. 
52 Linda Hogan, “Conscience in the Documents of Vatican II,” in Conscience, Readings in Moral 
Theology No. 14, ed. Charles Curran (New York: Paulist, 2004), 86. 
53 Vatican Council II, Declaration on Religious Freedom Dignitatis Humanae (Vatican City: Libreria 
Editrice Vaticana, 1965), no. 4. 
54 James Keenan, S.J., “Josef Fuchs at Eighty: Defending Conscience from Rome,” Theology Digest 
42, no. 2 (1995), 138. 
 20 
there are external and internal factors that might make one’s conscience err. In these cases, we 
wonder to what extent people are responsible for their acts and how to help people have a good, 
formed conscience. The understanding of erroneous conscience in the tradition of moral 
theology of the Catholic Church might shed light on this problem. 
b. Erroneous conscience  
b.1. What is an erroneous conscience? 
The concept of erroneous conscience has been discussed in the long history of the 
Catholic moral tradition. In his study, James Keenan has found in the writing of Thomas Slater, 
a Jesuit theologian, a list of obstacles that conscience faces regarding ignorance, 
concupiscence, fear, and violence. Through this list, Keenan suggests that though the 
manualists were known mainly as physicians of souls, they became the psychiatric caregivers 
of the inculpable sinners.55 Keenan also points out that Henry Davis gave a long list of 
categorically problematic consciences: the false, doubting, perplexed, scrupulous, and lax 
consciences. He concludes that this understanding of conscience allows us to see how easily 
and frequently the average Catholic deviates from the true conscience.56  
The Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches that, “faced with a moral choice, consci-
ence can make either a right judgment in accordance with reason and the divine law or, on the 
contrary, an erroneous judgment that departs from them” (no. 1799). The Catechism also 
affirms that it is not true that, in every case, one is excused from guilt when one acts according 
to one’s erroneous conscience. Moreover, the Catechism holds that “conscience can remain in 
ignorance or make erroneous judgments. Such ignorance and errors are not always free of 
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56 See ibid., 165. 
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guilt.”57 The documents of Vatican Council II and post-Council documents speak of conscience 
as the voice of God echoing in the depths of the person. However, they also teach that 
conscience can be in error. This error can be because of ignorance, carelessness, or bad habits. 
Gaudium et spes maintains that “conscience frequently errs from invincible ignorance without 
losing its dignity” (GS, no. 16). 
b.2. How can conscience be erroneous? 
It is noteworthy that, on the one hand, Gaudium et spes 16 presents that “conscience is 
the most secret core and sanctuary of a man. There he is alone with God, Whose voice echoes 
in his depths.” On the other hand, it says that conscience can be in error. Here, a question may 
be raised: if conscience is the most secret core of a person, how can a conscience be in error? 
According to Hogan, Cardinal Ratzinger points to a contradiction here when he wonders “how 
conscience can err if God’s call is directly to be heard in it, is unexplained.”58 
In order to respond to this question, it is important to articulate the understanding within 
the Catholic tradition of two aspects of conscience. According to the Catholic moral tradition, 
one’s conscience includes two aspects: innate and acquired. As a human being, each person is 
granted a potential capacity to make a good judgment. We can say this capacity is shared by 
all human beings. In order to make a good moral judgment, one has to learn how to make good 
moral decisions at different stages in one’s life. In this journey of moral development, one’s 
conscience can be in error for a variety of reasons. In other words, being rooted in the innate 
nature of the conscience, the judgment of one’s conscience can err because the formation of 
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conscience is a process acquired by the individual. This also implies that external factors play 
an important role in the good formation of one’s conscience.  
For Ratzinger, divine revelation and Christian community are good supports for one’s 
process of conscience formation. Ratzinger makes a distinction between an ontological level 
and a level of judgment. As we know, the medieval Scholastic tradition distinguished between 
two levels of conscience: synderesis and conscientia. Ratzinger explains that, though the word 
synderesis came into the medieval tradition to be identified with conscience, it “remained 
unclear in its exact meaning and for this reason became a hindrance to a careful development 
of this essential aspect of the whole question of conscience.”59 For that reason, he suggests that 
synderesis can be better expressed by anamnesis, a Platonic category, that today we might call 
“memory of the origin.” Anamnesis, the Platonic “memory,” does not impose moral authority 
externally, but draws out what is “written on our hearts” through conscience.60 He suggests 
that the anamnesis is something like “an original memory of the good and true… has been 
implanted in us, that there is an inner ontological tendency within man, who is created in the 
likeness of God, toward the divine.”61 Ratzinger maintains that because anamnesis belongs to 
the deepest and most profound part of a human being, it “imposes nothing foreign, but brings 
to fruition what is proper to anamnesis, namely, its interior openness to the truth.”62 According 
to Ratzinger, the fault of an erroneous conscience consists in the neglect of one’s being. He 
clearly affirms that “the guilt lies then in a different place, much deeper - not in the present 
act, not in the present judgment of conscience, but in the neglect of my being which made me 
deaf to the internal promptings of truth.”63 It is clear that Ratzinger refers to the foundation of 
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moral conscience that is a capacity and a tendency to openness to the truth through a constant 
dialogue with God in the deepest part of human beings. For Ratzinger, the central moral issue 
is the avoidance of the question of truth. An erroneous conscience is self-justifying only in a 
world in which truth has been shunted to the side.64 Ratzinger clearly points out that “the 
erroneous conscience which makes life easier and marks a more human course, would then be 
the real grace, the normal way to salvation.”65 He adds that, unfortunately, people would be 
more at home in the dark than in the light. For this reason, it is important to return to the roots 
of the Christian tradition and message to address the cases of erroneous conscience that are 
voluntary, either through a failure to bother to learn to discern wrong action or through 
continuous wrong action.  
The claim of Ratzinger is echoed in the definition of conscience presented in a recent 
textbook of moral theology in which Connors and McCormick present the full meaning of 
conscience as “not just the ability to make decisions about ethical questions confronting us in 
the present moment,”66 but rather conscience is 
A deep and abiding hunger within us to move beyond ourselves, a moral appetite 
constantly urging us on beyond all our limits and boundaries, calling us to stretch 
ourselves beyond our selfish and petty concerns, reaching out for others, for the moral 
good and ultimately for God.67 
From the spiritual perspective, interestingly Kenneth Himes suggests that “sloth as moral 
apathy is what hinders a person from pursuing that which is good.”68 Sloth is a refusal to seek 
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the good because it is difficult and demanding. To hear the call of conscience is to be aware of 
the divine invitation to become more fully and authentically human. Sloth permits the voice of 
conscience to be muted so that the moral quest for goodness ceases.69 If one does not desire to 
find the truth, if one is without passion for the truth and the good, it becomes evident that one 
cannot listen to and realize the voice of conscience among many other voices. 
 The insight of Ratzinger about conscience sheds light on the situation in Vietnam. It is 
clear that the law of God can be found in every culture, and if a human being earnestly and 
honestly listens to her conscience, she can discover an internal voice that tells her what she 
should do and what she must avoid. However, without the light of divine revelation and the 
gifts of God’s Spirit, it is difficult, if not impossible, for human beings to realize and live out 
the commands of the law of God. Indeed, as presented above, the Vietnamese cultural and 
traditional values partly permit one to realize that abortion is an immoral act; and, therefore if 
one honestly pays attention to one’s “heart” and opens oneself to the truth, she comes to know 
that her acts must be guided by a law written in her heart and must avoid immoral action. 
However, it is not easy to fulfill this mission. Indeed, under so many negative impacts from 
society and the existential environment, many people could not and do not want to 
acknowledge the truth that still partly echoes in their own heart. In this context, according to 
Ratzinger’s theology, Christian revelation may play an important role in awakening the 
transcendent dimension of human being that is partly neglected. Christian revelation does not 
promise to liberate one’s conscience from a sense of guilt. It is evident that the feeling of guilt 
might be both positively and negatively70 interpreted by a variety of perspectives, for example 
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cognitive, psychological, and religious perspectives. From a Christian point of view, we can 
say that, the feeling of guilt might be a result of an encounter between one’s conscience and 
the Christian message; through this encounter, a person is called to acknowledge oneself and 
repent. This journey is not easy, but it is important and indispensable. 
However, this account is not a total or satisfactory explanation of the situation in 
Vietnam. Indeed, experience tells us that there are many people whose conscience becomes 
hardened because of the habit of sinning. The moral tradition of the Catholic Church teaches 
that sins can make one’s conscience err. In the same line, Gaudium et spes reaffirms that sins 
or bad habits can become barriers by which one cannot follow the call of conscience. Vatican 
II speaks of conscience which “by degrees grows practically sightless” as a result of a practice 
of sinning (GS, 16). In this state, error virtually defies correcting because the individual is not 
open to recognizing his or her situation. Arising from persistence in sin, the condition is a guilty 
one, yet the person no longer feels guilty or hears the call to repent.71 
In other words, the feeling of guilt may decrease and even disappear as a consequence 
of sinful habits. A person who decides to have an abortion, and who involves others, directly 
or indirectly,72 in this decision, might experience a strong guilt. However, guilt might 
disappear. This is dangerous for one’s process of moral development. When one no longer 
feels guilty and cannot be aware of one’s own sinful situation, she cannot repent. According to 
Ratzinger, the capacity of a person to know one’s guilt is very important for human life. By 
citing A. Görres, Ratzinger affirms that a “feeling of guilt, the capacity to recognize guilt, 
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belongs essentially to the spiritual make-up of man. This feeling of guilt disturbs the false calm 
of conscience and could be called conscience's complaint against my self-satisfied existence.”73  
Finally, it is important to refer to external conditions that limit and distort the freedom 
of conscience of a moral agent in some cases in Vietnamese society. The moral tradition has 
talked about external factors that can violate seriously the conscience of a person. These 
elements might belong to a culture or an existential environment where a person lives or they 
come from unjust structures that one sometimes does not even acknowledge. In Vietnamese 
society, as I will present more clearly in the next chapter, sexism, collectivist culture, unjust 
law, and consumerism are four structural and social elements that might limit or distort one’s 
conscience when people make a moral decision. These external elements may create fear and 
pressure that violate one’s conscience. Hence, although these elements do not eliminate totally 
a capacity to make a free decision of conscience, they somehow limit this capacity and hence 
are considered as mitigating factors of the moral responsibility of a moral agent.  
b.3. How do I know my conscience is in error?  
When we discuss erroneous conscience, a question should be raised: how do I know 
my conscience is in error? In other words, are there signs which help one to realize that her or 
his conscience is erroneous? It seems to me that this is important because, if one does not know 
one’s conscience is in error how can they overcome it? Curran contends that “both the theory 
and experience of consequent conscience emphasize the remorse of conscience as a sign of an 
erroneous conscience.”74 He maintains that remorse is exactly the opposite of the joy and peace 
of a true conscience. One might argue that the feeling of joy and peace may be experienced by 
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people whose conscience is in error because they cannot realize the fact that they are acting 
from an erroneous conscience.  
Based on the anthropological theology of Lonergan, Curran argues that the self-
transcending subject has a deep drive and thrust toward the truth. Therefore, as a human being, 
one is always searching for truth by asking pertinent questions. As long as there are unanswered 
questions, I still seek and do not feel fulfillment in my heart. By nature, the human being is 
given by God an inclination to the truth and the good. And human beings continually search 
for the truth by raising questions. Once one more or less attains answers to these questions, one 
feels happiness, joyfulness, and peace in one’s heart. Curran holds that there are three possible 
situations in which one’s conscience cannot obtain peace and joy: finitude, sinfulness, and the 
lack of eschatological fullness.75  
c. Erroneous conscience and moral responsibility 
The tradition of Catholic moral theology distinguishes between invincible ignorance and 
vincible ignorance. In Veritatis Splendor, Pope John Paul II describes an invincible ignorance 
as “an ignorance of which the subject is not aware and which he is unable to overcome by 
himself.”76 Therefore, it can be said that an act can be wrong, but the moral agent is not 
responsible for that act. In other words, in such a case, a mistake would not be a sin, since a sin 
must involve a deliberate choice of an evil, knowing the good. Bretzke argues that invincible 
error concerns mitigating factors which are so serious that the person most likely cannot see her 
own error and fault; hence, for the lack of such moral insight the person is not personally 
culpable.77 One is mistaken, but one does not know it, and also there is nothing one could have 
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done, or can do now, to prevent or correct the situation. In these circumstances, one should follow 
one’s erroneous conscience, but there is no guilt in doing so.  
There is also a blameworthy erroneous conscience. In this case, the ignorance is one’s 
own fault. Faced with moral truth, we all tend to evade it or to self-deceive ourselves because, 
if we realized and acknowledged the truth clearly, it would make demands on us. In this 
situation, one is culpable because one has a vague awareness of the truth but consciously 
suppresses it. When one’s conscience is in error like this following such a conscience we do 
not escape guilt. In other words, because our conscience errs, we are responsible for our 
erroneous acts.  
In Veritatis Splendor, John Paul II argues that the evil done following a judgment of 
erroneous conscience remains an evil or disorder (VS, 63). The languague used here reminds 
us of Thomas Aquinas, who makes a distinction between malum, peccatum, and culpa. Based 
on this distinction, we can see that the act resulting from erroneous conscience remains a malum 
and a peccatum, but not a culpa. This means that an evil remains an evil but is not culpable.  
Hogan contends that the Vatican II documents limited the discussion of the erroneous 
conscience only to the issue whether the error was caused by vincible or invincible ignorance. 
And she contends that there are elements in history that might help us to resolve this problem,78 
as James Keenan has argued. Indeed, James Keenan explains that, in the theology of Aquinas, 
one can find a clue for this important distinction. He proposes that we should think of rightness 
as being a judgment of reason, whereas goodness pertains to the heart.79 Keenan states this 
distinction in the following way: “goodness measures whether out of love one strives to attain 
a rightly ordered self… Rightness on the other hand, measures whether one actually attains a 
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rightly ordered self.”80 One may cultivate a disposition that strives for moral goodness, in 
accord with the triple love command, and thereby strive for right action in line with that 
character, and still make erroneous judgments of conscience. 
However, there are situations in which it is difficult or almost impossible to make a 
clear distinction between invincible ignorance and vincible ignorance. To what extent does one 
have to be reponsible for one’s actions when one is not totally free from pressures from outside? 
Bernard Häring argues that invincible ignorance should not be interpreted simply as a 
rational intellectualism, but rather we should consider invincible ignorance in a broader 
perspective. He contends that it is “a matter of a person to ‘realize’ a moral obligation. Because 
of the person’s total experience, the psychological impasses, and the whole context of his life, 
he is unable to cope with a certain moral imperative. The intellectual difficulties of grasping 
the values behind a certain imperative are often deeply rooted in existential difficulties.”81 The 
insight of Häring helps us more easily to understand the situation in Vietnam. I suggest that, if 
we understand an invincible ignorance only in term of rational intellectualism, there are very 
few people whose erroneous consciences are listed in this category. This implies the fact that 
many cases of erroneous consciences are vincible and a moral agent who acts in accordance 
with one’s conscience is culpable.  
To address a cultural argument, Bretzke argues that, although culture has been with us 
since the dawn of human existence, our understanding of how each culture operates and what 
it involves is only now beginning to unfold. One of the reasons for this delayed attention to the 
role of culture in human morality is due to the understanding of the human person influenced 
by Greek philosophy that tended to focus on a conceptualization of “human nature.” He argues 
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that there have been many examples in the long history of Catholic moral theology to indicate 
that our understanding of moral values might be limited by the cultural and historical 
conditions in which we live. Using slavery as an example, he concludes that in the past the 
Church accepted slavery because, at least in part, this was due to the invincible ignorance of 
our culture at that time. He contends that “while ignorance may seem to be invincible, this is 
not absolutely the case for all times, as both individuals and whole societies can grow in moral 
wisdom.”82 
From a feminist perspective, Linda Hogan contends that insights from feminist 
theologians are particularly important in this regard because they have taught us a lot about 
how we attain moral knowledge, in particular about the role of contexts and communities in 
the mediation of value. What these theorists remind us is that our consciences are formed in 
the context of communities, within the currents of discursive traditions, and through our 
interactions with the world around us. This is important because this approach articulates a 
more comprehensive understanding of the nature of moral truth and how human beings come 
to discern that truth.83 In a slightly different way, William Spohn rightly points out that 
conscience relies on the moral quality of the group to which we belong. He argues that recent 
research indicates that people identify with those values and principles that are supported by 
communities that matter to them.84 Consciences are dulled when the young are not taught an 
adequate moral vocabulary and when moral debate is “dumbed down” into the vocabularies of 
self-interest and utilitarian advantage.85 It is clear that, just as positive values from community 
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positively help a person form her conscience, so negative values may have a negative impact 
on one’s formation of conscience. 
In summary, by examining in cultural and traditional values and by listening to the call 
of conscience, each person should know that abortion is an immoral act one should avoid. 
However, unfortunately these voices sometimes are partly neglected when a person forgets the 
transcendent dimension of the human being or when one’s conscience is darkened and 
hardened by the worldly attachments, bad and sinful habits, or these voices are suppressed by 
external pressures from culture and society. The traditional distinction points out that one is 
not culpable if she acts according to her invincible ignorance. Unfortunately, much ignorance 
is vincible; hence, one must be responsible for her own immoral acts. Moreover, the new 
understanding of conscience reminds us that the process of one’s formation of conscience 
might be impacted by values and principles that are found in cultures, communities, and 
existential environments where one lives and to which one belongs. This suggests that culture 
and society may create impediments that prevent individuals from living their lives in 
accordance with their consciences. Particularly in Vietnam, I contend that sexism, collectivist 
culture, unjust law, and consumerism might prevent a person from doing what their conscience 
dictates. Therefore, in the next chapter, by articulating the concept of social sin, this thesis 








Chapter 2: SOCIAL SIN: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ABORTION IN VIETNAM  
While focusing on a case, this chapter attempts to understand in what way social sin 
negatively impacts an individual’s moral agency. This chapter first presents the understanding 
of social sin in both the theology of John Paul II and liberation theology and highlights how 
some structures cause evil. I argue that social sin, though not usually considered a personal sin, 
limits the freedom of choice of a moral agent and that sinful economic and political structures 
tend to create a culture of conformity and passivity. Finally, applying that to the case study, I 
contend that, in some ways, gender inequality, oppressive collective culture, and unjust laws 
all violate human dignity, limit and violate human freedom, and distort the capacity of a moral 
agent to make a good moral judgment. 
1. Social sin in the teachings of the Catholic Church 
a. The concept of social sin  
In a recent article, Conor Kelly highlights both the importance and the difficulty of 
using the terms social sin and structural sin  in contemporary discussion of social sin. He notes 
that “much ambiguity still surrounds the concept” and “the precise relationship between the 
categories of structural sin and social sin is often unclear, to the point that the two terms are 
sometimes used interchangeably.”86 He asserts that “structural sin is a species of the larger 
genus of social sin, which refers more broadly to all types of social influences that induce 
individuals to sin.”87 Hormis Mynatty highlights that the ambiguity in the contemporary 
                                                        
86 Conor M. Kelly, “The Nature and Operation of Structural Sin: Additional Insights from Theology 
and Moral Psychology,” Theological Studies 80, no. 2 (June 2019), 294. For Kelly, “structure of sin” 
and “structural sin” can be interchangeably used because they typically appear as two linguistic 
formulations of the same idea. 
87 Ibid. 
 33 
discussion on ‘social sin’ or ‘structural sin’ is most evident in the lack of a common 
understanding of this notion.88 
In the official documents of the Catholic Church, John Paul II uses the two concepts in 
his writings without making a clear distinction among them. However, it is important to note 
that John Paul II uses the terms in an analogous sense because for him sin is the act of a person. 
Among other theologians,  some similar but slightly different terminology has been  developed 
and used, such as “sinful social structures” (Patrick Kerans), “structural violence” (Darlene 
Fozard Weaver), “structures of sin, structure of vice” (Daniel Daly).89 
Mark O’Keefe notes that the term “social sin” could easily imply that social institutions 
themselves can commit sin. This would be clearly contrary to the traditional Catholic 
foundation of sin in human freedom and knowledge, which cannot be predicated regarding 
institutions.90 By introducing the concept of ontic evil, Joseph MacKenna makes a great 
contribution that might respond to this challenge.91 By this term, he means that social sin is not 
a sin as understood by the Catholic tradition about sin. Rather, social sin is a premoral or ontic 
evil. For example, when one holds that sexism is social sin, it means that it is an ontic evil. 
This implies that the culpability of this sin will be determined in view of the act-in-totality, 
which includes consideration of the surrounding circumstances and the motivation of the agent 
to know about and act upon structural evils. Similarly, Vidal argues that unjust structures can 
be called sinful structures because they have a sinful character.92 In The Acting Person and 
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Christian Moral Life, Weaver makes a vital contribution when she highlights that “what the 
language of sin helps us to see is that the very conditions of our moral agency  reason, freedom, 
desire are distorted by sin.”93  
Following O’Keefe, I contend that, to varying degrees, all these terms emphasize the 
fact that sin, even when social, exercises its influence on persons both externally and internally. 
Accordingly, the following analysis will use “social sin” as the term with the broadest 
connotation, though it will be used interchangeably with the terms sinful structures or unjust 
structures.94  
b. The key elements of the Catholic ethics of social sin  
What does social sin mean? Where does this theological term come from? Although 
the theology of social sin has been developed after Vatican Council II, especially under the 
pontificate of Pope John Paul II, the seed for a social analysis of sin was already present in 
Catholic social teaching and council documents and has been developed in the context of Latin 
American liberation theology. Gaudium et spes thus stresses the call for dialogue with the 
world and an examination of social, cultural, and political realities in the light of the gospel.95 
The treatment of the social dimensions of sin in Gaudium et spes represents an advance beyond 
that of Sacrosanctum concilium insofar as it attends to the role of social structures, but it does 
not contain an explicit invocation of the language of social sin. While the Council Fathers 
avoided mentioning social sin in the paragraph 109 of Sacrosanctum Concilium, Gaudium et 
spes par. 25 affirms that humans “are often diverted from doing good and spurred toward evil 
by social circumstances in which they live and are immersed from their birth.” And “when the 
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structure of affairs is flawed by the consequences of sin, man, already born with a bent toward 
evil, finds there new inducements to sin, which cannot be overcome without strenuous efforts 
and the assistance of grace.”96  
It is interesting to note that the account of social sin emerged in the context of a local 
church, namely, the Latin American church. At the second general conference in Medellín, the 
Latin American bishops introduced the language of social sin into magisterial teaching. 
Margaret Pfeil notes that “the Latin American bishops did not intend to undermine the 
importance of personal agency in formal sin, but they did want to draw a closer connection 
between human sinfulness and the pervasive webs of structural injustice enveloping their 
countries.”97 The Third General Conference of the Latin American Episcopate, held at Puebla, 
Mexico, in 1979, marked another significant development in the concept of social sin. Pfeil 
observes that “building on the pope’s language, the bishops’ final text speaks of ‘situations of 
social sinfulness’ and ‘individual and social sinfulness.’”98 The bishops observed that structural 
sin99 profoundly influenced personal moral development. The bishops contend that “culture is 
continually shaped and reshaped by the ongoing life and historical experience of peoples; and 
it is transmitted by tradition from generation to generation.”100  
Pope John Paul II played an important role in incorporating the concept of social sin 
into the magisterial teaching of Catholic theology. At his homily at the closing of Puebla, the 
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pope referred to “sinful structures” for the first time. After that, he continued to develop this 
treatment in his 1983 Apostolic Exhortation, Reconciliatio et Paenitentia and then in the social 
encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987).101 
In Reconciliatio, before presenting what social sin is, the pope confirmed that all sin is 
personal. He wanted to be sure that presenting the concept of social sin does not mitigate 
against the personal dimension or responsibility for sin. The pope held that a situation or 
structure, although it can be unjust, cannot in itself be a sin, since it lacks personal free will 
and, thus, moral agency.  
In this document, three meanings of social sin emerge in the theology of Pope John 
Paul II. First, “by virtue of human solidarity which is as mysterious and intangible as it is real 
and concrete, each individual’s sin in some way affects others” (no. 16). The pope contended 
that every personal sin affects others because “a soul that lowers itself through sin drags down 
with itself the church and, in some way, the whole world” (no. 16). Therefore, according to 
this first meaning of the term, “every sin can undoubtedly be considered as social sin” (no. 16).  
Second, in the language of the Gospel, social sins are the sins that directly attack one’s 
brother or sister. In this sense, social sin is sin against love of neighbor, and in the law of Christ 
it is all the more serious in that it involves the Second Great Commandment, which is “like 
unto the first” (no. 72).  
The third meaning of social sin refers to the relationships among the various human 
communities. These relationships are not always in accord with the plan of God, who intends 
that there be justice in the world and freedom and peace among individuals, groups, and 
peoples. When he moves to the third dimension of social sin, the pope takes great pains to 
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emphasize personal accountability and the analogical nature of social sin, cautioning that even 
analogically sinful social phenomena “must not cause us to underestimate the responsibility of 
the individuals involved” (no. 16). For John Paul II, social sin remains fundamentally personal 
because a situation or an institution is not properly the subject of moral acts. 
In Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, although John Paul gave more attention to structural 
realities, he yet again emphasized the individual dimension of sin. We find a definition of 
structures of sin as “the sum total of the negative factors working against a true awareness of 
the universal common good, and the need to further it, [which] gives the impression of creating, 
in persons and institutions, an obstacle which is difficult to overcome” (no. 36). It is interesting 
to note that, in this encyclical, we find a brief answer to the question of how structures and 
institutions can be called sinful. According to John Paul II, structures of sin “are rooted in 
personal sin, and thus always linked to the concrete acts of individuals who introduce these 
structures, consolidate them and make them difficult to remove” (no. 36). Baum remarks that, 
in a footnote, the text refers to Reconciliatio et Paenitentia which demonstrated how social sins 
are related to personal sins.102 Once again, the pope holds the individual morally accountable, 
while stressing the extensive social consequences of personal action. John Paul II’s use of the 
language of social sin expresses his insistence on personal responsibility for sin. 
The 1995 Encyclical Evangelium Vitae marked John Paul’s final significant 
development of the concept. 
It is at the heart of the moral conscience that the eclipse of the sense of God and of man, 
with all its various and deadly consequences for life, is taking place. It is a question, 
above all, of the individual conscience, as it stands before God in its singleness and 
uniqueness. But it is also a question, in a certain sense, of the “moral conscience” of 
society: in a way it too is responsible, not only because it tolerates or fosters behavior 
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contrary to life, but also because it encourages the “culture of death”, creating and 
consolidating actual “structures of sin” which go against life.103 
I cite this whole paragraph because this is the first time the pope applies the concept of moral 
conscience to society. It seems that the pope intends to ascribe moral responsibility to a non-
moral agent. For Pope John Paul II, an unjust society is responsible because it fosters negative 
values and encourages the “culture of death.” As a moral agent, a society which freely created 
unjust structures that promote the “culture of death” has a kind of moral responsibility. In the 
text cited above, the pope does not explain to what extent social structures have a moral 
responsibility for moral evils that occur in society; however, his affirmation is important 
because the passage demonstrates that the pope is aware of the role of social structures in 
forming the consciences of individual moral agents. In other words, the formation of individual 
conscience is partly impacted by the conscience of society. By emphasizing the “culture of 
death,” the pope seems to suggest that unjust structures have the capacity to create unjust and 
evil outcomes and to profoundly impact the moral development of a moral agent. 
From what is presented above, two critical conclusions can be drawn: first, in the case 
of social sin, John Paul II emphasizes a primarily personal understanding of sin and, secondly, 
the pope did not explain successfully how and in what way culture has an influence on moral 
agency. 
As we noted above, Vatican II does not use the concept “social sin” lest the centrality 
of personal agency in formal sin be undermined. This concern of the Council’s Fathers is also 
shared by John Paul II. Although indeed he is the first pope to refer to and describe the concept 
of social sin, it is clear that for John Paul II, as John Langan puts it, “personal sin remains the 
fundamental category, and the notion of structures of sin is secondary and derivative both in 
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terms of our thinking about our situation and our actions to transform it.”104 This concern is 
understandable because the pope is afraid that so much emphasis on the social dimension of 
sin runs the risk of undermining individual moral responsibility.  
Moreover, when the pope explains social sin, he asserts the moral truth that although a 
situation can be unjust, it cannot be considered to commit a sin by itself because it lacks 
personal free will. By emphasizing the personal dimension of sins, and by confirming that a 
situation or institution is not properly the subject of moral acts, the pope underestimates the 
importance of structural transformation. In my judgment, the pope is quite right when he 
stresses personal conversion because this is the core of the message of the Gospel.105 However, 
this conversion needs to lead to social and structural transformation; and an emphasis on 
structural transformation leads Christians to realize their responsibility for evangelizing the 
environment which they inhabit.  
The individualistic, act-oriented approach of traditional morality in theology led to a 
neglect of social justice. Based on the work of Peter Henriot, Heyer contends that “the Catholic 
moral tradition has neglected, if not resisted, a social understanding of sin due in part to an 
individualistic, act-oriented approach in traditional moral theology and a legalistic approach to 
questions of social justice.”106 Gregory Baum points out that, in comparison with the 
Medellín’s teachings on social sin, John Paul’s discussion of social sin remains less sensitive 
to the unconscious dimension of social sin and the impact unjust structures have on personal 
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agency.107 Therefore, the pope emphasizes the analogical nature of social sin because social 
structures cannot be subjects of moral decisions. Daniel K. Finn states that, in defense of the 
concept of social sin, José Ignacio González Faus has argued that rejecting social sin because 
there is not a single conscious person making the decision would require rejecting the notion 
of original sin for the same reason, an unthinkable option for Catholic theology.108 
Second, we need to understand the reason why magisterial teaching discusses social 
sin. Margaret Pfeil rightly contends that “the aim… is not to explore the pastoral dimensions 
which gave rise to the language of social sin, but rather to circumscribe its use theologically.”109 
Because of this, John Paul did not elaborate on how, and to what extent, unjust social structures 
affect individuals. Commenting on this document, Heyer contends that “whereas the document 
gives brief mention to the impact of social environments that turn people away from the good, 
on the whole its analysis of structural injustice and social sin remains weak.”110 Pfeil holds that 
“those who stressed the pastoral necessity of offering a stronger theological account of the 
social dimensions of sin seemed to speak from their own concrete experiences of structural 
sins.”111 
c. How do evil structures cause evil? 
Peter Henriot points out that “properly functional social structures provide greater and 
better opportunities for human growth available to all groups in society. Unjust and 
                                                        
107 See Gregory Baum, “Structures of Sin,” in The Logic of Solidarity: Commentaries on Pope John 
Paul II’s Encyclical on Social Concern, eds. Gregory Baum and Robert Ellsberg (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis, 1989), 113. 
108 See Daniel Finn, “What Is a Sinful Social Structure?” Theological Studies 77, no. 1 (2016), 138; 
and see José Ignacio González Faus, “Sin,” in Mysterium Liberations: Fundamental Concept of 
Liberation Theology, eds. Ignancio Ellacuria and Jon Sobrino (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 
532-42, at 537. 
109 Pfeil, “Doctrinal Implications of Magisterial Use of the Language of Social Sin,” 141. 
110 Heyer, “‘An Echo in their Hearts’: The Church in Our Modern World,” 35. 
111 Pfeil, “Doctrinal Implications of Magisterial Use of the Language of Social Sin,” 138. 
 41 
unresponsive social structures hinder this human growth and freedom, thereby oppressing 
human dignity.”112 Whereas social sin may not directly cause personal sin or a reversal of one’s 
fundamental option, it “creates an environment in which it becomes more difficult to make 
good choices,” heightening the tendency “present because of original sin to turn away from 
God.”113 According to Baum, unjust structures create in persons a blindness that prevents them 
from recognizing the evil dimension of their social reality. He adds that “sinful economic and 
political structures tend to create a culture of conformity and passivity.”114 Hence, as long as 
ignorance, nonrecognition, and ideological prisons hold sway, “there is no critical freedom and 
hence no personal sin in the strict sense.”115 In a slightly different way, Joseph H. McKenna 
suggests that the success of structural evil lies in the fact that structural evil entails a kind of 
“hiddenness.” We tend to ignore its influence and even its presence because “over time and 
generations, evil has seeped into the recesses of society and culture.”116 If it is perceived at all, 
it is perceived as a “natural given.”117 It invites us to cooperate with it in ignorance, and it 
thrives on that ignorant cooperation.118 
In addition, although each individual has personal freedom in exercising moral agency, 
the freedom of the individual person never exists in a vacuum. Indeed, while one’s freedom is 
personal, it is always exercised and formed within the limits of the cultural, social, economic, 
and religious contexts which she inhabits. While human beings, as free agents, can determine 
and make a decision that overcomes the obstacles of social factors, this freedom is also limited, 
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structured, and even to a degree constituted by the social world in which the person lives. In 
other words, the freedom of a person can be distorted by social factors because freedom is itself 
social.119  
Moreover, in exercising their moral agency, a person is partly influenced by the 
prevailing values of a culture. For example, in Vietnamese society today, influenced by 
consumerism, the prevailing values of the culture are wealth, success, and reputation while 
there is a tendency to dismiss more human values such as respect for human beings. On the 
other hand, a person can be largely blind to those values which are not embodied in one’s 
culture and its institutions. It is partly through education that these values are imparted to 
citizens. John Paul II points out that “man … is also conditioned by the social structure in 
which he lives, by the education he has received and by his environment. These elements can 
either help or hinder his living in accordance with the truth.”120   
Finally, from a sociological perspective, many theologians and sociologists use theories 
of sociology to explain how social structures impact an individual. Utilizing the perspective of 
sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, Daniel Daly argues that “Berger’s and 
Luckmann’s theory of social and personal formation helpfully describes this complex 
relationship.”121 Daly suggests that Berger’s argument can be summarized in two movements: 
“Externalization is the ongoing outpouring of human beings into the world… objectification is 
the attainment by the products of this activity of a reality that confronts its original producers 
as a facticity external to and other than themselves. Internalization is the re-appropriation by 
men of this same reality, transforming it once again from structures of the objective world into 
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structures of the subjective consciousness.”122 Through our habitual actions as a society, we 
“externalize” certain values and vices that then, as it were, take on a life of their own. Daly 
argues that although the free moral agent has the capacity to resist one’s given cultural 
structures, and even to alter these structures through externalization, “the objectified structures 
of any society will continually exert influence and pressure on the agent.”123 He contends that 
social values become “objectified” or “institutionalized” in a way independent of the 
individuals who “created” them. In society, these structures then influence our decisions and 
actions - negatively if they are vicious structures or positively if they are virtuous structures. 
In short, unjust social structures or evil structures are continually shaped and re-shaped by the 
ongoing life and historical experience of peoples; they might be hidden and are an integral part 
of culture. However, they distort the freedom of an individual and they are transmitted by 
tradition from generation to generation through education and socialization. 
d. Social sin and moral responsibility  
How can anyone be held responsible for social sin? To what degree does a moral agent 
hold responsibility for what one does not know and is not free to do? These questions have 
been raised and discussed among contemporary theologians. To answer these questions is 
important. As McKenna highlights, social sin is a suspect theological category because in this 
concept, actual culpability can be difficult to recognize.124 
First, one may argue that no one should be held responsible for evils that result from 
social and structural sins because structural injustices are beyond the choice, or, indeed, any 
action of individuals. Although it is true to say that persons constitute society, the structures of 
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society “take on a history” of their own. People are born into societal structures which pre-
exist them, and which continue without their conscious choosing.125 In other words, through 
habits of thinking, attitudes of mind, traditions, cultural practices, laws, and institutions of 
society, these unjust structures embody the structural dimension of human behavior. Gradually, 
these structures attain a status of quasi-autonomy and produce evil without the conscious 
participation of the individuals. 
Second, from a traditional moral perspective, one can argue that the responsibility of a 
moral individual may mitigate or even diminish due to the hiddenness of and blindness to social 
sins. Indeed, sin is an interior, intentional consent to a known evil. Therefore, people cannot 
be held morally responsible if they do not know the wrongness of their actions or are not free 
to do otherwise. In traditional terms, Mark O’Keefe rightly points out that, “if one were 
knowingly and willingly to support and enhance an unjust structure or situation, one would 
somehow be responsible for the injustice which results.”126 However, in reality, it is difficult 
for the moral agent to have either full knowledge of the evil she or he commits or full consent 
to the act. As we discussed earlier, the nature of structural evil entails a kind of hiddenness and 
blindness, and these evils have seeped into other social realities such as cultures, customs, 
traditions, and even languages.  
Responding to the first argument, it can be said that, although individuals are not 
responsible for the existence of the socially unjust structures, they are, at least in part, 
accountable for them, because these structures continue to exist precisely when “the individuals 
deliberately choose to seek their own advantage at the expense of others, or by acting with 
complicity or indifference in the face of evil.”127 In other words, although individuals can be 
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affected by these unjust structures, on the other hand, they maintain and perpetuate them. For 
this reason, many theologians, for instance Kelly, insist that structures of sin still have personal 
moral agents in the background.128 Similarly, Mynatty contends that “an institution or social 
structure never exists in and of itself, independently of the individuals composing it.”129 In a 
slightly different way, John Paul II, in “Instruction on Certain Aspects of the ‘Theology of 
Liberation,’” strongly affirms that structures are consequences of human actions. He writes: 
“structures, whether they are good or bad, are the result of man’s actions and so are 
consequences more than causes.”130 Moreover, structural evils are stable and difficult to change 
because structural evils also are usually protected by those who want to preserve their own 
privileges and positions. To put it another way, individual sins “strengthen those forms of 
social sin, which are actually the fruit of an accumulation of many personal sins.”131 Finally, 
since we participate in the process of creating society, we share in the responsibility for causing 
social sin. Therefore, it can be said that, though the existence of structures is not the 
responsibility of individuals, yet each person holds partial responsibility for them when they 
maintain and perpetuate them.  
Regarding the latter argument, it is clear that ignorance should not be used too quickly 
to excuse a person from all moral responsibility and culpability. First, it is true that social sin 
entails a hiddenness that prevents a moral agent from knowing, it is also important to note that 
the blindness is never absolute and final as long as moral freedom and responsibility can be 
awakened.132 In discussing sinful social structures, by using the metaphor of “darkness” for 
sin, Kerans highlights that blindness usually is a result of an active choice of the moral agent. 
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He contends that “within that darkness, it has some meaning to say that we as communities 
have knowingly remained ignorant, we have cherished illusions.”133  
Moreover, it is not true that no kind of ignorance can be culpable. Should I be motivated 
to know about structural evils? Following Catholic moral tradition, Rubio argues that some 
kinds of ignorance can be culpable because “we are responsible for knowing about injustice in 
the world, if not for knowing everything.”134 Indeed, according to Aquinas we are under an 
obligation to know those things “without the knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish 
a due act rightly.”135 On the other hand, we are not bound to know specific, technical 
information. Therefore, ignorance that entails neglect of what one is bound to know is a sin of 
omission.136 Social sin becomes possible when ignorance is a factor insofar as ignorance is 
voluntary and therefore culpable.  
To explain more clearly how one participates in social sins, Rubio provides an approach 
that helps us to recognize the structural nature of the problem. In Rubio’s account, social forms 
are sinful insofar as they stand in opposition to the Kingdom of God. Drawing on the category 
of cooperation with evil from the Catholic manual tradition, Rubio argues that moral 
responsibility for structural evils includes not only causal contributions to harmful structural 
outcomes but also participation in sinful social forms. Traditionally, this principle has been 
used to account for the ways in which we can become partially responsible for evil acts 
performed by others. In Rubio’s reformulation, cooperation with evil includes the wrongness 
of our participation in sinful social forms. I contend that this participation can be understood 
in two senses: passive and active. In other words, people might participate in social-structural 
                                                        
133 Kerans, Sinful Social Structures, 100. 
134 Julie Hanlon Rubio, Hope for Common Ground: Mediating the Personal and the Political in a 
Divided Church (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 39. 
135 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 76, art. 2. 
136 See ibid. 
 47 
sin either by conscious participation with and perpetuation of sinful structures, or simply by 
the omission of possible action to change these structures. In the same vein, Vidal contends 
that, “the extent of participation in structural injustices is measured by the criterion of action 
and passion, that is, by the extent to which each person shapes the unjust social situation and 
allows himself to be shaped by it.”137  
Indeed, people passively participate in social and structural sins by laziness, apathy, or 
fear. McKenna contends that apathy is a sin of omission. It is usually a product of a disabled 
will in the face of massive evils. He writes: “When a person has knowledge of a particular evil 
but simply lacks motivation to act in any way upon that knowledge, this is apathy and it is a 
sin in that person.”138 In the same line, in Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, John Paul II holds that 
social sins may be result of the personal sins of “those who are in a position to avoid, eliminate 
or at least limit certain social evils but who fail to do so out of laziness, fear or the conspiracy 
of silence” (no. 16). On the other hand, people can actively participate in unjust structures when 
they maintain and profit from them. John Paul II clearly points out this kind of sinful 
participation by referring to the personal sins of those who cause or support evil or who exploit 
it, “through secret complicity or indifference.”139 For Vidal, social sin in such a situation is a 
result of the human weakness of individuals. He puts it thus: “Here sin consists in the injustice 
of those who by reason of selfishness, evasion or lack of sensibility, create or culpably maintain 
structures which oppress human dignity.”140 In short, it can be said that, as a member of society, 
by participating in unjust structures both passively and actively, to some extent each holds 
responsibility for evils that stem from unjust social structures. 
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2. A critical and ethical evaluation of abortion in Vietnam in the light of social sin  
John Paul II reminds us that naming the reality of sin helps to shed light on the 
structures and attitudes that harm people. Hence, in light of what we have indicated earlier 
about social sin and applying it to Vietnam, I argue that sexism, oppressive collective culture, 
unjust law, and consumerism are four structural and social elements that negatively impact 
one’s moral decision-making.  
a. Sexism 
Vietnamese-American theologian Peter Phan notes that “the ancient Vietnamese family 
system was most likely matriarchal, with women ruling over the clan or tribe. Later, adopting 
the patriarchal system introduced by the Chinese, the Vietnamese began to favor the male and 
disparage the female. In terms of progeny, a son is said to be worth ten daughters.”141 The 
woman is said to be governed by three submissions: before marriage, she is subjected to her 
father; in the marriage bond, to her husband; and when widowed, to her son. Moreover, this 
sexism is reinforced by the traditional filial piety which plays an important role in Vietnamese 
culture and is, indeed, manifold. According to this tradition, one of the sacred duties of filial 
piety is to provide the family with progeny, especially male progeny, so the lineage and family 
name may be perpetuated.142 Therefore, having a son is an indispensable duty of a man. As 
Peter Phan argues, under the influence of literary movements inspired by the French 
Enlightenment, many unjust customs and practices detrimental to the dignity of women have 
been abolished; hence, the individual and autonomy have been promoted.143 In my judgment, 
this claim is only partly true, because in reality in many parts of Vietnam, especially rural areas, 
men still rule. Women are relegated to marginal roles, are often discriminated against, and are 
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victims of violence and abuse behind the walls of their homes. Many women do not have a 
right to their own bodies or decision-making power regarding being a mother. Ivone Gebara 
notes that studies on the question of evil from the perspective of gender are few, especially in 
theology.144  
How does sexism influence one’s decision-making in our case study? First, I argue that 
the structure of the Vietnamese family and society does not support a culture that respects and 
promotes the dignity of women. In Vietnamese culture, women are still considered inferior and 
dependent on men.145 For instance, many families still give priority to their sons obtaining 
education and receiving heritage. This bias certainly devalues a woman’s role in both family 
and society. What Ivone Gebara rightly pointed out in Brazilian culture is also true in 
Vietnamese culture: “The fate of being female is often considered a misfortune. One cannot 
help noticing how many men (and women too) want their first-born to be a boy partly because 
of the idea that the man keeps the family name, but also because a man has more chances for 
happiness than a woman.”146 Son-preference strongly influences fertility decisions. Indeed, 
some scholars, such as Jonathan Haughton and Danièle Belanger, show that due to the 
importance of having a son, many couples opt for sex-selective abortions of a female fetus.147  
Therefore, it can be said that sexism certainly exists and influences one’s decision-
making in many cases of abortion. Indeed, while the high value placed on the boy-child has 
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been tempered by the influence of the state’s social policies and modernity, the eldest boy in a 
family often still holds preferential status. Therefore, having the first boy-child is considered 
an inescapable duty of a woman. If couples do not give birth to a son, women will be placed 
under great pressure. Women might be blamed for infertility or “sonlessness.” Some women 
might be labelled as being “unable to give birth.” This reality is demonstrated by many studies; 
Mead Cain, for instance, asserts that gender inequality in the access and control of resources is 
a critical factor driving strong son-preference among women.148  
Furthermore, sex-selective abortions at times are explained in terms of the tradition of 
filial piety. Due to this tradition, every family wants to have a male child, especially the first 
born. In many cases, in order to fulfill the desire to have sons for their husbands, many women 
must have more than one abortion because her family does not want her to give birth to her 
child if the unborn child is a female. Rachel Burr looked at what it means to be a good child in 
Vietnam and suggested that ancestral worship—still widely practised throughout the country—
was the key element that leads to sex-selective abortion which is also damaging to girls.149 
Additionally, some studies suggest that this reality has worsened by the one-or-two 
child policy. According to Burr, due to the limited number of children, if a woman cannot have 
a first son-child, she is under pressure to have a son in her second pregancy.150 As a result of 
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this situation, many women are pressured to choose abortions as a possible solution in hoping 
that they would have a son in their next pregrancy.  
Finally, sexism also significantly impacts the way a man behaves in a sexual 
relationship. Some studies show that using contraception is seen as a wife’s responsibility. For 
instance, according to Hanh Nguyen, for many Vietnamese, contraception, being pregnant, 
giving birth, and childrearing are considered to be a woman’s “natural function.”151 Similarly, 
Gammeltoft highlights that fertility control is often perceived as a burden which women have 
to bear.152 As a result, women hold all responsibility for an unwanted pregnancy. I contend that 
such a sexist attitude not only drives some women to have abortions unwillingly, but also leads 
many young women to lose the confidence and self-esteem to act as autonomous and integral 
moral agents in the realm of sexuality this harms their moral agency.    
In conclusion, it can be said that sexism, justified by patriarchal ideology or by a 
misunderstanding of anthropological foundation, is a structure of sin that harms moral agency 
and leads some women to have abortions unwillingly.153 Undoubtedly, a structure that violates 
human dignity is a sinful structure. In the Apostolic Letter Mulieris Dignitatem, John Paul II  
affirms that, by mediatating on what the Gospels say about Christ’s attitude towards women, 
“we can conclude that as a man, a son of Israel, he revealed the dignity of the ‘daughters of 
Abraham’ (cf. Lk 13:16), the dignity belonging to women from the very ‘beginning’ on an 
equal footing with men.”154 Because of sexism, sometimes a woman “is left alone,” “while 
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behind ‘her’ sin there lurks a man a sinner, guilty ‘of the other’s sin’, indeed equally responsible 
for it.”155 In this apostolic letter, John Paul II contends that the dignity of women is rooted in 
the Bible and needs to be protected and promoted. Unfortunatly, sexism still exists in many 
places all over the world and thereby many women have become the victims of this social sin, 
suffering due to others’ sins and structural unjustices in society as happens in Vietnam. 
b. A collectivist culture 
As a collectivist culture, traditional Vietnamese society is centered on the village 
community and this community is composed of families. In these social structures, the 
individual’s freedom is very limited. Members of a family are expected to subordinate their 
personal interests to those of the family as a whole.156 Everyone has an obligation to take care 
of and obey the older generation.157 This culture also strongly impacts marriage and 
procreation. In other words, the community plays an important role in shaping people’s 
reproductive desires and behavior.158 A woman is expected to give birth at least to a son-child 
for her husband’s family. As explained earlier, failing to do that, the woman will face pressures 
and frustrations from the family. Such a pressure on the sonless woman worsens because of 
gossiping in the community where she lives. Many women attempt to become pregnant with a 
son due partly to this social pressure.  
Moreover, a collectivist culture tends to limit individuals in their ability to ask critical 
questions, which gradually creates a passive tendency in the moral agents. Further, a collective 
culture prevents one from making one’s own decisions and, consequently, from assuming one’s 
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own responsibility. Indeed, a sense of responsibility develops only through repeatedly making 
intentional, responsible, and knowledgeable decisions. When one is not encouraged to make 
decisions and be responsible, one probably will not cultivate and grow in one’s sense of 
responsibility. Many educators have explained the current moral crisis in Vietnam in terms of 
a crisis of moral responsibility.  
In addition, it is evident that family dynamics play a very significant role in Vietnamese 
culture. In this communally-oriented culture, everyone tries to save face for each other. Loss 
of face is painful in any society, but unbearable in Vietnam. If a young woman gets pregnant 
outside of wedlock, her misconduct is blamed not only on herself but also on her ancestors, 
parents, siblings, and friends. Faced with this situation, the family strongly influences what the 
young woman might do. In some cases, it can be said that she had an abortion not because she 
wants to or because her conscience dictated it, but rather because  she thought it was the best 
solution to save her family’s reputation. Therefore, it is evident that the difficult decision is 
made for the benefit of her own family. It is my experience that one of the main reasons why 
Vietnamese single women have abortions is to avoid public rumor, to save the family’s 
reputation, or to avoid punishment and rebuke from their parents.  
Due to the collectivist culture, Vietnamese youth have a very limited ability to exercise 
responsibility. Therefore, faced with difficult situations, they do not know how to make a good 
decision. It is evident that the responsibility of the partner also plays an important role in the 
case of abortion. Stanley Hauerwas reminds us that “the most critical factor in the decision to 
abort was the relationship with the male partner.”159 This factor is especially true in Vietnam 
where a young woman might decide to have an abortion because her partner refuses to assume 
                                                        
159 Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Teaching 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 200. 
 54 
his responsibility. In such a situation, a woman may face many difficulties if she wants to keep 
her child. The irresponsibility of a young man might force a young girl to decide to do what 
she may not want to do. It is even worse for the woman because, in this case, she is the only 
one who has to shoulder the burden of guilt for the abortion. 
The preceding analysis shows how unjust cultural practices may create sinful situations 
in which one can easily fall into sin. It is difficult to realize and overcome these structures 
because they tend to hide themselves within the culture. Unjust structures and cultural 
ignorance might lead a person’s conscience to be mistaken, as we discussed in the first chapter.  
c. Unjust law and public policies 
I contend that policy plays an important role in explaining what has been happening in 
Vietnam. As presented above, abortion was legalized and has been considered a means of 
contraception. To attain the set goal, the government sometimes encouraged people to have 
abortions and so normalized this immoral action by using the confused term “menstrual 
regulation” instead of abortion. This reality clearly reflects the nature of social sin that tends 
to hide the immoral action as indicated by the Catholic moral tradition. It is evident that this 
usage makes many people misunderstand what they actually chose to do.  
Moreover, it is very important to note the language used in the population law. The 
most popular terms are “strategy,” “benefits,” and “planning”–terms that are often used in 
economics. This law does not aim to protect the dignity of the human being; rather, the law 
aims to reduce, to control, and to improve the quality of the population. Annika Johansson and 
others observe that in almost all cases they studied, the major reason for abortion was expressed 
in economic terms.160 They also highlight that the view of abortion has been presented in 
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technical terms as a medical intervention. Ethical aspects of abortion and how they might be 
dealt with in counseling situations are not mentioned in these documents.161 Such legal 
language in Vietnam mirrors, in part, the collectivist culture in which an individual is not 
respected as a human being and at times is considered just a thing and a number.  
Therefore, it can be said that the population law has ignored the ethical aspects of 
abortion. In my view, in Vietnam, “there is a need to recover the basic elements of a vision of 
the relationship between civil law and moral law.”162 The relationship between civil law and 
moral law has been thoughtfully discussed by Pope John Paul II. Indeed, the pope recognizes 
that “the purpose of the civil law is different and more limited in scope than that of the moral 
law.”163 The pope also reaffirms the content of Donum vitae,  contending that the civil law can 
neither replace one’s conscience nor dictate norms concerning matters outside its 
competence.164 Following St. Thomas Aquinas,165 the pope agrees that “public authority can 
sometimes choose not to put a stop to something which were it prohibited would cause more 
serious harm.”166 However, it is clear that this principle should not legitimize any “offence 
against other persons caused by the disregard of so fundamental a right as the right to life.”167 
Civil law must ensure that all members of society enjoy respect for certain fundamental rights 
which belong to the person, rights which every positive law must recognize and guarantee.168  
One may argue that a decision to have an abortion does not totally depend on the 
legislation of abortion because there are many private medical centers which a woman may 
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access to have abortions. I think that it is important to note the pedagogical dimension of the 
law. Although legislation does not directly affect the decision of those who want to have an 
abortion, such legislation makes many people gradually think that it is morally acceptable to 
have an abortion.169 People tend not to raise the ethical question regarding what is legal. 
Moreover, because of the political situation, the law was composed and approved by members 
of the Communist party without consulting the opinions of citizens. The citizens could not 
express their own opinions and reclaims their rights. Moreover, due to the education of a 
collectivist culture, the people, especially women, are not ready to participate in public 
discussion. They are silent because they are not accustomed to expressing their own opinions. 
This silence is clearly contrary to what should be because “the law should always express the 
opinion and will of the majority of citizens.”170 As a result, “choices once unanimously 
considered criminal and rejected by the common moral sense are gradually becoming socially 
acceptable.”171   
In addition, some scholars have argued that parental discrimination against a female 
fetus is exacerbated by strict population policies.172 It can be said that any social-structural evil 
causes a number of other evils. Indeed, the one-or-two-child policy introduced new potential 
contradictions regarding women’s fertility. On the one hand, women who do not have a son 
worry about not having a male heir. On the other hand, they feel pressure from local authorities 
to keep to the two-child limit. The social value placed on having a son coupled with policy-led 
restrictions on family size can lead to consequences other than sex-selective abortion that are 
also damaging to girls. Finally, public policies on social security, the market and healthcare 
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services also certaintly influence son-preference in the contemporary context. Indeed, social 
security systems are very weak in Vietnam; in such a situation, most people must be self-
reliant. Elderly people usually depend on their children, primarily their son(s), as Tran 
suggests.173 In my view, this defect of social policy likely has increased the value of sons to 
their parents. Most parents tend to have at least a boy-child as insurance for their elderly lives 
and this, consequently, can lead to sex-selective abortions. 
d. Consumerism and social justice  
First, the Vietnamese society today is acutely influenced by materialism and 
consumerism. Materialism and possession of things have become very important in the lives 
of many. Therefore, for many, having is more significant than being. This is demonstrated by 
the government’s ambitious population policy that seeks to create a society in which every 
person can possess as much as possible. In such a society, a human being is somehow 
considered property. Being influenced by the mentality of materialism and consumerism, some 
young people are losing or forgetting the transcendental dimension of life. For John Paul II, 
“when the sense of God is lost, there is also a tendency to lose the sense of man, of his dignity 
and his life.”174 The human being seems to be reduced to the physical horizon, and “he is 
somehow reduced to being ‘a thing.’ He no longer considers life as a splendid gift of God, 
something ‘sacred’ entrusted to his responsibility and thus also to his loving care and 
‘veneration.’”175 It seems that some lose sight of the truth of life, that is, that having things 
must serve the being of the living person, and not vice versa. Correa and Sgreccia remind us 
                                                        
173 See Tran, Global Debates, Local Dilemmas Sex-selective Abortion in Contemporary Viet Nam, 68. 
174 John Paul II, The Gospel of Life, no. 21. 
175 Ibid., no. 22. 
 58 
that life is the being of human beings, not one of a person’s states.176 Life is one of the most 
important values in Vietnamese culture.177 The Vietnamese people commonly speak of life as 
a gift of Heaven. In the logic of gift, clearly, we do not have the gift of life but we are this gift; 
it is not up to us to destroy this gift.178 Because life is God’s gift, although we can and should 
intervene to heal, we have no right to exercise choice by interfering in the natural process of a 
life’s beginning.179  
In sum, we can say that negative social influences lead many Vietnamese youth to lose 
the true value of life. Somehow, life becomes ‘a thing’ that can be thrown away. Pope Francis 
usually refers to some aspects of our culture as the “throw away culture.”180 He affirms, “A 
widespread mentality of the ‘culture of waste’ that today enslaves the hearts and minds of so 
many, comes at a very high cost: it asks for the elimination of human beings, especially if they 
are physically or socially weaker.”181 
Secondly, in recent years, the movement of rural populations out of agriculture in 
search of jobs in urban centers has dramatically increased. Along with this process, many new 
economic, social, and ethical challenges have emerged, especially for the young. For example, 
poor country girls have to leave their village to come to the city to earn a living where they 
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face many social and economic challenges, such as loneliness, lack of family support, an 
unstable income, sexual abuse, etc. Being alone in a big city, many young women become 
pregnant outside of wedlock. Sometimes a pregnancy is the result of a free choice but, because 
of economic difficulties, the woman might want to abort because she cannot keep the unborn 
child. In these circumstances, the woman is faced with difficult choices when she knows her 
limits to meet the most basic responsibilities to a child and others. How can she give birth to a 
child with a salary just enough to afford her own living cost? Y-Lan Tran, a Vietnamese 
theologian and medical doctor, rightly points out that “without familial and financial support, 
single girls become pregnant and often resort to abortion.”182 Indeed, the costs of raising 
children has been rising rapidly; the high cost of having children is an important concern for 
many young couples.  
Finally, sometimes some women become pregnant because they are victims of sexual 
abuse or sexual attacks. And, of course, the men who abused them often refuse to take 
responsibility for their abuses. In such situations, a woman faces an ordeal and great human 
and social challenges if she wants to keep the child. In this situation, young and poor girls have 
lost control over their lives, their bodies and their sexuality; the women’s pregnancies were not 
fully voluntary, and yet often they were also lacking the resources and support they needed to 
become mothers if they were to give birth. Unfortunately, in a such situation, the woman  holds 
the  responsibility for the sin of the man.  
In summary, by naming social factors that negatively impact a moral agent, I have 
explained how unjust social customs and evil structures may limit or distort the freedom of a 
moral agent. Therefore, this approach is of great importance to address a moral problem such 
                                                        
182 Y-Lan Tran, “Vietnam in Transition: Theological and Ethical Challenges,” in Transformative 
Theological Ethics: East Asian Contexts, ed. Agnes M. Brazal (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila 
University Press, 2010), 51.   
 60 
as abortion in Vietnam; it is not enough to ascribe all responsibility to individuals and to 
condemn them accordingly. Rather, it is important to address social and structural factors that 
suppress the dignity of human beings and distort their moral capacities for making good and 
sound moral decisions. Being conscious of the fact that evil outcomes are the results of both 
social structures and individual choices, our responses  should accordingly reflect both personal 
and communal dimensions. For this reason, in the last chapter, I propose that solidarity and 
conversion are required to respond to the tragic situation of abortion in Vietnam. 
 
Chapter 3: SOLIDARITY, CONSCIENCE, AND RESPONSIBILITY  
By recognizing that human beings are, by nature, interdependent, as confirmed by both 
Catholic anthropological theology and Vietnamese culture and tradition, we acknowledge that 
all of us are called to be in solidarity with all human beings. This call to solidarity pushes us to 
contemplate the suffering of others and to attempt to understand the cry of the wounded. As an 
ethical imperative, such solidarity continues to call us to promote the human dignity of those 
who are oppressed and marginalized. This understanding of solidarity becomes a power that 
compels all people to act in order to eliminate the suffering of others.  
In Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (SRS), John Paul II offers an extensive treatment of 
solidarity and describes it as a virtue. According to him, solidarity “is a firm and persevering 
determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say, to the good of all and of 
each individual, because we are all really responsible for all.”183 This definition implies a 
human telos that includes flourishing in both a social and a personal way. Kenneth Himes et 
al. contend that the use of solidarity as a virtue in SRS underscores a theme that is often 
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overlooked in Catholic Social Teaching (CST): the need for a change of heart as well as a 
change of structures.184 In recent years, some ethicists have begun to examine links between 
structural change and personal flourishing. Similarly, some theologians refer to solidarity as a 
possible way to deal with particular evils. For example, Lisa Cahill highlights the fact that on 
abortion John Paul II names solidarity as a virtue necessary to address the problem of 
abortion.185 Drawing on this inspiration, through the lens of virtue, this chapter argues that 
one’s cultivation of the virtue of solidarity, in both Christians and non-Christians, can 
transform the society in which one lives.  
To attain this goal, in dialogue with the contemporary scholarly discussion on the virtue 
of solidarity, this chapter proceeds with the following four steps. First, the chapter briefly 
introduces the key elements of the Catholic ethic of solidarity. Then, it presents a 
comprehensive account of the virtue of solidarity, explaining what the principle of solidarity is 
and how one cultivates this virtue by practicing it. After that, it explains the relationship 
between the virtue of solidarity and the structure of sin, and how one’s cultivation of solidarity 
can be linked to the transformation of the societies which one inhabits, and in a more particular 
way, how the practice of solidarity addresses the social problems in our specific research on 
abortion. Finally, the chapter will suggest some practical and pastoral implications for our 
discussion. 
1. The key elements of the Catholic ethic of solidarity 
Although the theological term solidarity has been widely discussed among Christian 
ethicists, it is worth noting that Pope Pius XII was the first pope to explicitly use the term 
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“solidarity” in his writings, referring to Scripture to ground his claims. In his 1939 encyclical 
Summi Pontificatus, he argued that “the first page of Scripture” (Gen 1:26–27) undergirds the 
law of “human solidarity and charity,” revealing our common origin and that all human beings 
are created in the image of God.186 According to René Coste, solidarity constitutes one of the 
great themes of Gaudium et spes and is mentioned explicitly in numbers 4, 31, 57, and 85.187 
Pope Paul VI takes up this term when he refers to “the spirit of solidarity” in his encyclical 
Populorum Progressio. Building on this document, 20 years later, John Paul II elevated the 
importance of solidarity within questions of ethics and identity in his encyclical Sollicitudo Rei 
Socialis. John Paul II contends that “true development must be based on the love of God and 
neighbor, and must help to promote the relationships between individuals and society.”188  
Traditionally, solidarity is necessarily linked to human dignity and human rights. 
Indeed, to assure the conditions for development, solidarity requires both a radical commitment 
to protect the dignity of each person and that of the whole human family. Throughout the 
tradition, solidarity is understood as a principle, a duty, an attitude, and a virtue. As an attitude, 
each of us is called to be aware of our interdependence; as a duty, solidarity lays down 
normative foundations that evoke a sense of responsibility for others. 
In a recent article, Gerald J. Beyer presents a very good summary of the biblical and 
theological foundations of the virtue of solidarity. He contends that “the Bible may not use the 
word solidarity, but numerous texts provide a foundation upon which modern CST is built.”189 
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He maintains that CST has developed its conception of solidarity within a rich biblical and 
theological framework.190 The foundation of solidarity is an anthropological “datum” that 
realizes that human beings are by nature interdependent. On account of this, the good of 
individuals is predicated on the development and good of the whole human family. Solidarity 
entails the recognition that we are one human family whose members are called to love and 
care for one another. The virtue of solidarity requires us to be a part of the whole human family. 
For John Paul II, solidarity is not just “vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes 
of others” but rather “a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the good of 
all and of each individual, because we are all responsible for all.”191  
In CST, solidarity is often understood in three ways: a duty, a principle, and a virtue. 
Marie Vianney Bilgrien recognizes that “only since 1987 has solidarity been considered and 
analyzed as a virtue,” and that “it has a much longer history as an attitude, duty or principle.”192 
Bilgrien contends that John Paul II offers solidarity as a virtue in SRS because he recognizes 
that virtue is more effective in transforming persons and society.193 In SRS, John Paul II offers 
an extensive treatment of solidarity, and for the first time in a magisterial document describes 
it as a “virtue.” Although John Paul II names solidarity as a virtue, in his encyclical, “there is 
little evidence that the Pope is working from a Thomistic framework of virtue ethics.”194 In 
other words, by being distant from Thomistic tradition, John Paul II did not provide a sound 
account of the virtue of solidarity. Moreover, as Himes and others argue, one might raise the 
concern that such an emphasis on solidarity as a virtue, like John Paul II’s use of other 
theological language, might lead to a displacement of the centrality of justice and the common 
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good in Catholic social teaching.195 This concern might lead us to a further question: what is 
the relationship between solidarity, justice, and the common good? 
In response to these issues, the following part attempts to give an account of the virtue 
of solidarity in Thomas Aquinas’s view of virtue ethics. In other words, I answer some 
important questions such as: If solidarity is a virtue, what are its principles? Is solidarity an 
infused virtue or an acquired virtue?  
2. Searching for a comprehensive account of the virtue of solidarity  
a. What is the virtue of solidarity? 
As noted, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, the virtue of solidarity “is not a feeling of vague 
compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the 
contrary, it is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good; 
that is to say to the good of all and of each individual because we are really all responsible for 
all.”196 
From this definition, it is easy to recognize the formal object and the material object of 
solidarity. The former is clearly our common humanity and the latter is the common good that 
includes the good of all and of each individual. Rooted in the Thomistic tradition, Marie 
Vianney Bilgrien and Meghan Clark attempt to give John Paul’s account of solidarity an 
Aristotelian and Thomistic basis.197 Both theologians place solidarity in the context of 
traditional principles of CST such as the common good and the dignity of human beings.198 
Like Bilgrien, Clark contends that the formal object of solidarity is common humanity and its 
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telos is the universal common good. Unlike Bilgrien, however, Clark insists on the active 
participation of the poor in the process of solidarity. In a recent article, Tisha M. Rajendra 
argues that almost all Christian ethicists fail to consider the fact that there may be an 
inconsistency between the practice of solidarity and its object, the common good.199 Her 
argument is based on a “dialectical relationship” between the flourishing both of the individual 
and the social context. She holds that, in Clark’s account of the virtue of solidarity, there is a 
degree of risk to the bearer in the virtue of solidarity and this practice of solidarity might pose 
a threat to the common good.200  
Moreover, from his definition, it seems that John Paul II undervalues the affective 
dimension of solidarity. Donal Dorr realizes this gap in John Paul’s account of solidarity and 
contends that it is important to be attentive to the affective dimension of the virtue. He puts it 
thus: “there is one point at which his account of the virtue of solidarity seems to be somewhat 
underdeveloped: it appears to lack an affective dimension: account of the experience of 
solidarity and the strong feelings that are part of it.”201 I think that this is an important 
consideration because the affect plays a vital role in the formation of virtues. Clearly, in an 
existential community, one shares the sufferings and joys, fears and hopes of others. By sharing 
the same experience, one grows in a sense of belonging, the feeling of being part of these 
people. This shared feeling and the sense of belonging to one’s group evoke and nurture the 
sense of responsibility for one another. They thus experience individually that their lives cannot 
be fulfilled without the participation of others.  
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In my view, James Keenan’s definition of solidarity sheds particular light on these 
issues. Inspired by his own experience, Keenan states that “solidarity is not first and foremost 
a principle for action; solidarity is an affective and spiritual union with others whose life 
situations are also being challenged and compromised. From that union, we are called to act in 
justice. Solidarity is then first a fundamental, existential, deeply felt sense of union; but 
secondly it is a call to engage in certain moral practices to better the life situation of the 
other.”202 In this definition, it is easy to realize the balance of two dimensions of the virtue of 
solidarity: the affective and the practical. Some may raise the concern that such an emphasis 
on the affective dimension of solidarity might lead to undervaluing its practical dimension. It 
is true that virtues, in the Thomistic sense, need to be practiced and to lead to action. In other 
words, a virtue is not only an attitude or a disposition; rather, it is a disposition that must be 
actualized in a concrete action. I argue that, however, this does not refute the affective 
dimension of the virtue of solidarity. Indeed, only by practicing the virtue are the internal 
feelings of belonging and of union evoked and nurtured. In living out the experience of 
solidarity, one grows in the feeling of union with others and from that union, one is called to 
act in justice for the sake of others.  
b. Is solidarity a Christian virtue? 
In John Paul’s account, solidarity is undoubtedly a Christian virtue. Solidarity is closely 
related to key Christian concepts such as gratuity, forgiveness, and reconciliation. For John 
Paul II, solidarity is a Christian virtue because it is founded not only on human and natural 
bonds, but also on awareness of the common fatherhood of God, in light of the communion of 
the Trinity.203 The pope insists that, by the grace of God, a Christian might become a 
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“sacrament” by which the grace of God can be transmitted to others. He strongly trusts in the 
positive transformation of human nature that is effected in virtue of the love of the Father, the 
redemption brought by Jesus Christ, and the action of the Holy Spirit. John Paul II insists that 
because a human being is the image of the Creator and placed under the redemptive influence 
of Christ, therefore, despite the heritage of sin and the sin which each one is capable of 
committing, there still exist in the human person sufficient qualities and energies for a 
fundamental goodness.204 Thus John Paul II’s optimistic view reflects the Thomistic view of 
human nature. As Lisa Cahill explains, “Aquinas places considerable trust in human reason 
and evinces a comparable degree of optimism about the potential of natural humanity, hindered 
though it may be by sin and ignorance, to establish justice in personal and social relationships 
and thereby achieve a peaceful political order governed by law.”205  
Although solidarity is a Christian virtue, it is also found in other contexts. Indeed, 
solidarity plays an important role in many cultures and religious traditions. For example, the 
Vietnamese people, in the context of their constant striving for independence in the face of 
invasion by  other countries, have developed and transmitted many narratives that encourage a 
sense of the union of the whole people of the nation. This view is confirmed by the emphasis 
CST places on the fact that the human being is social.  Solidarity in CST calls for this kind of 
unity among differences. It entails the recognition of the de facto interdependence of all human 
beings. CST claims that, as human beings, we share a common human nature, and therefore 
we have responsibility for one another. Some argue that solidarity could exist only among those 
with the same interests, but CST suggests a solidarity that can transcend the boundaries of 
class, gender, race, and nationality.206 Along the same lines, Thomas Massaro contends that 
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solidarity is something which belongs to the natural capacity of all human beings. He says that 
“to be human is to have a heart that is moved by stories of desperate need and crying injustices. 
Humanitarian responses to people in crisis are practically instinctual.”207  
Is it possible for all human beings to practice solidarity? Some pessimistically maintain 
that solidarity exists only among those having the same interest. This implies that the virtue of 
solidarity does not belong to human nature and is not a duty or principle which is demanded 
for all. In his recent article, Beyer attempts to demonstrate the possibility of solidarity, in part 
responding to some biologists who contend that human beings are essentially selfish and so 
always acting in their own interest while occasionally masquerading as altruists. He argues that 
“universal solidarity is not contrary to human nature. Rather, social solidarity is an expression 
of inherent tendencies built upon the evolved biological origins of the human species.”208 In 
another article, Beyer contends that “this vision of the human person, the font of solidarity, can 
be construed as a Christian theological anthropology, but it does not have to be. Nonbelievers 
can also share it.”209 
Within the Thomistic view, the virtue of solidarity can be considered in terms of 
acquired virtue or infused virtue. If solidarity is an infused virtue, it must come from God’s 
grace and therefore is accessible only to Christians. In other words, one might raise the question 
of whether the virtue of solidarity is accessible and applicable to all persons, or something that 
is distinctively Christian. Or is it both? In response to this issue, William Mattison contends 
that the Thomistic tradition on virtue is especially helpful in solving the apparent dilemma. 
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First, Mattison argues that the relationship between solidarity and charity is an appropriate way 
to address this issue.210 By explaining Thomas’ view on virtue, he argues that solidarity is a 
moral virtue because it is “oriented toward natural human happiness.”211 By explaining what a 
theological virtue is, Mattison concludes that “since solidarity’s object is not God directly, and 
since solidarity is possible without God’s grace directing one to the supernatural destiny of 
eternal happiness, it is not a theological virtue, but rather a moral virtue.”212 By using the 
famous formula of Aquinas, grace perfects nature, Mattison insists that “infused solidarity 
retains important continuities with the acquired ‘human solidarity’ accessible to all.”213 He 
rightly points out the character of continuity and the difference between the two different 
natures of a virtue as solidarity. Indeed, the ultimate goal of the persons with each virtue differs, 
and thus the immediate actions have different meanings. 
In short, solidarity is a helpful term for the two audiences that CST and John Paul II 
address in their social encyclicals: Catholics and all people of good will.214 Solidarity is 
understood well by both audiences. All human beings can appreciate the interdependence of 
the world in which we live and the need to respond to that interdependence in a spirit of 
solidarity. Such an account of solidarity is confirmed and enforced by the recent contributions 
of virtue ethicists.  
c. The practice of solidarity  
Moral virtue is formed by habit and it is through this habituation process that it becomes 
second nature, a firm character. Explaining how the moral agent can be virtuous, Aristotle 
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states: “first of all, he must know what he is doing; secondly, he must choose to act the way he 
does, and he must choose it for its own sake and in the third place, the act must spring from a 
firm and unchanging character.”215 In recent works, in different ways, many ethicists contend 
that community plays a pivotal role in the formation of a virtue. Lúcás Chan, a Catholic 
theologian, points out that the importance of community in virtue formation is built upon the 
fundamental presupposition that virtue is teachable.216 Among Protestant ethicists, Stanley 
Hauerwas is known for focusing on the notion of character and the roles of community and 
narrative in moral formation.217 In short, in different ways, ethicists confirm the importance 
community plays in virtue formation.  
Similarly, in his account of solidarity, John Paul II insists that this virtue must be 
exercised within each society and within international society.218 As a social virtue, the practice 
of solidarity importantly requires the role of the community. In other words, solidarity is a 
virtue that individuals must develop and practice in their social relations. To practice the virtue 
of solidarity, one needs to be nurtured by sympathy and compassion, which are the conditions 
for promoting solidarity. Solidarity, after all, is not something that can be done alone—it 
requires the agency and gift of grace extended by another, in this case, the poor. In reaching 
out to the poor and the suffering in mercy, and in offering to help carry their burdens, the non-
poor find themselves borne up by the faith and the generosity of the poor.219 Christianity offers 
us a way to allow our suffering, especially through solidarity with others, to generate new life.  
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Being with others in their sufferings is a key to the mystery of Christianity. As 
Christians, we are called to imitate God when we are willing and ready to enter into the chaos 
of others.220 Helping anyone in need is entering into the entire “problem” or “chaos” of their 
situation. By the mystery of the Incarnation, the Word of God has entered into the chaos of 
human existence so that by the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, we are brought out of 
the chaos of our slavery to sin. By imitating Christ, Christians are called to practice solidarity 
and mercy; by doing so, we become more like God who entered into our own chaos.221 
Moreover, only by becoming involved in others’ situations and chaos can we understand the 
reason why others are in chaos. Bilgrien highlights that “the first element of solidarity is an 
open ear and an open heart for the needs and the suffering”222 of others. This leads us eventually 
to face what causes that chaos. By encountering others, we are able to be awakened to the call 
of solidarity that leads us to act for the common good and for justice. Therefore, the acts of 
solidarity necessarily require being with others, especially the poor, the oppressed, and the 
marginalized. Acting in solidarity allows us to meet people in need and, in turn, we are moved 
to promote justice.  
d. Exemplars in the virtue of solidarity  
Chan contends that “virtue ethics also appreciates the role that exemplary figures play 
in the development of virtue and formation of character.”223 For him, exemplars first show us 
what a virtue means practically and, secondly, teach and encourage us to act likewise.224 Patrick 
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M. Clark argues for an expanded role of moral exemplars in contemporary virtue ethics.225 He 
builds his argument by beginning with the work on exemplarism of Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, 
who contends that paradigmatically good persons are crucial for understanding the meaning of 
goodness and virtue.226 In presenting an account of the virtue of solidarity, John Paul II insists 
on the role of exemplars in practicing the virtue by saying that many of the Church’s canonized 
saints “offer a wonderful witness of such solidarity and can serve as examples in the present 
difficult circumstances.”227  
 Interestingly, according to Christopher P. Vogt, Clark links this general theory to the 
Christocentric approaches to moral theology found in the work of Livio Melina and in Veritatis 
Splendor, both of which put forward Jesus Christ as the ultimate exemplar and norm for 
Christians.228 In other words, Jesus becomes the exemplar for the practice of the virtue of 
solidarity. From this insight, Mark Potter offers an account of solidarity in the Spiritual 
Exercises. By doing so, he presents a helpful way of understanding the dynamics of solidarity 
as a relevant praxis of mutual transformation.229 In the Spiritual Exercises, retreatants are called 
to contemplate the earthly life and the mission of Jesus. By doing so, they learn from him how 
to involve themselves in others’ chaos, how to be compassionate to others’ feelings and needs, 
how to act for the sake of others. The third week of the Spiritual Exercises brings the retreatant 
through a particularly difficult but powerful contemplation of compassion: Jesus’s compassion 
for the world, and the apostolic call to unite Jesus’ Passion to one’s own life, so as to respond 
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to the world’s needs. The emphasis on relationality in the Trinity itself and in Jesus as our 
model for solidarity acknowledges both the transcendent dimension and the historical purpose 
of the human being. By emphasizing the role of experience, feminists refer to the exemplary 
role of Jesus who joins with all kinds of people in solidarity, be they lepers, the woman at the 
well, tax collectors, or prostitutes.  
In short, as a social virtue, an exemplar plays an important role in the formation of the 
virtues. Each culture and tradition contains a variety of narratives that foster solidarity within 
that people. Christian narratives center on the incarnate mystery of Jesus Christ; thereby 
Christian solidarity embraces Jesus Christ as the ultimate exemplar.  
3. The virtue of solidarity and the structure of sin 
On October 23, 2019, many Vietnamese around the world were shocked when they 
came to know that 39 Vietnamese were found dead in a refrigerated trailer discovered in Grays, 
a town next to the Thames River, east of London. The 39 victims were young and poor 
undocumented immigrants who had been convinced that they could find a good job in England 
and, thereby, help their families. Many Vietnamese were deeply moved when they read that 
one of the victims had texted her parents, “I’m dying because I can’t breathe,” and then 
apologized because her “path abroad didn’t succeed.”230 In the following days, I received some 
messages and phone calls from my family and friends. We talked about this; and friends of 
mine who hold US citizenship also showed their sorrow and compassion to the victims because 
they said that we are Vietnamese and we love these people.  
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Through social media, many Vietnamese shared their feelings and sorrow with the 
families of the victims. Surprisingly for me, many people began to question why so many 
young Vietnamese risk their lives to find a better life. They also referred to the fact that many 
victims came from a place where their livelihoods had been destroyed by the toxic pollution 
that results from irresponsible and unsustainable business practices.231 Reflecting on what 
happened, I think that, amidst these disasters, the Vietnamese showed a spiritual union with 
others whose life situations were also being challenged. From that union, these people became 
aware of unjust social structures that lead to these disasters. In my view, this solidarity could 
become a call to engage in certain moral practices to ameliorate the life situations of others. 
Given such massive suffering on a global scale, it is crucial that all those who wish to 
address human needs and dismantle unjust social structures share their insights and work 
together practically to make solidarity a greater reality. In the following section, I will suggest 
how the practice of solidarity might make social transformation possible. 
a. Bringing us together  
A person is a social being. No one is an island; no one can live one’s life fully without 
others. In SRS, John Paul II asserts this truth when he says that “today perhaps more than in 
the past, people are realizing that they are linked together by a common destiny, which is to be 
constructed together, if catastrophe for all is to be avoided.”232 This reality of interdependence 
reminds us of “the need for a solidarity which will take up interdependence and transfer it to 
the moral plane.”233 Clearly, John Paul II realized positive signs of a growing awareness of the 
solidarity of the poor among themselves, in “their efforts to support one another, and their 
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public demonstrations on the social scene which, without recourse to violence, present their 
own needs and rights in the face of the inefficiency or corruption of the public authorities.”234  
To analogy, this approach can also be applied by international relationships. Therefore, 
for John Paul II, the reality of interdependence must be transformed into solidarity, based upon 
the principle that the goods of creation are meant for all. This reality demonstrates how 
solidarity can lead to a possibility of social transformation when it gathers the strengths of a 
group that shares the same sense of responsibility for justice and the common good. In other 
words, the virtue of solidarity enhances the communal power that might help one get involved 
in the mission to protect and promote the dignity of human beings. On the one hand, Doran 
contends that the human person is called to transcend herself in co-existence and co-action. 
Therefore, in solidarity with others, each person “recognizes that there is no conflict between 
the good of the person and the good of the community, but that these goods can really only be 
achieved together.”235 On the other hand, Gregory Baum argues that in his encyclical 
Redemptor hominis, by laying a Christological foundation for the Church’s social ministry, 
John Paul II contends that Jesus Christ identified himself in some sense with all human beings 
in their historical groupings.236 As a result, solidarity is not a class struggle; rather, it is an 
ethical achievement. Far from a class struggle, people who stand together in the struggle for 
justice are impelled by several motives, including ethical ones. 
b. A way to protect and promote human rights and human dignity 
As Clark argues, there is a close link between solidarity and human rights or human 
dignity. As a social virtue, the telos of solidarity is not limited to the flourishing of an 
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individual; rather, “through the virtue of solidarity, we can begin to be more fully what we 
ought to be,”237 as Clark puts it. For John Paul II, the good of a community is realized only 
when “its members recognize one another as persons.”238 The common good has always played 
an important role in CST because it focuses on both the person and the community. This double 
focus is further highlighted in Pope John XXIII’s definition of the common good. In his 
encyclical Mater et Magistra, the Pope defines the common good as “the sum total of those 
conditions of social living, whereby men are enabled more fully and more readily to achieve 
their own perfection.”239 In this encyclical, the pope also argues that true community exists 
“only if individual members are considered and treated as persons, and are encouraged to 
participate in the affairs of the group.”240 Because of the tight connection between human rights 
and the common good, CST reminds us of a profound obligation to promote the human rights 
and flourishing of others as part of the common good. To some extent, the common good is 
also the origin and meaning of political authority, as Christiansen notes in commenting on 
Pacem in Terris, arguing that “solidarity means recognizing that all political authority exists 
to fulfill the common good of the whole human family.”241 Following this tradition by 
emphasizing participation, John Paul II argues that an authentic community is one of solidarity. 
He puts it thus: “solidarity is also the foundation of a community in which the common good 
conditions and liberates participation, and participation serves the common good, supports it 
and implements it.”242 As a virtue, the substantive meaning of solidarity includes not only 
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political or social conditions but also a commitment to personal flourishing and participation 
in the universal common good.243 
This characteristic of solidarity sheds light on our discussion in a few ways. First, as 
we explained earlier, by exercising solidarity, one feels a sense of responsibility for others, 
especially for the poor, the weak, and the marginalized. In solidarity with those people, we are 
able to become more fully human, more fully who we are. The exercise of solidarity helps us 
realize that our neighbor’s dignity and rights are bound up with our own; our humanities are 
bound up in each other. Indeed, the necessary and tight connection between human rights and 
solidarity is based on a philosophical and theological anthropology of a community of equal 
human persons. Both human rights and solidarity flow necessarily from what it means to be a 
human created in imago Dei. Clark maintains that “the starting point for both human rights and 
solidarity is the human person.”244 The virtue of solidarity reminds us that each person, 
including an unborn child, is a human being whose dignity and right need to be protected and 
promoted. The first right of a human being is a right to life. Solidarity helps us to see the “other” 
as a person. Moreover, it is important to think about responsibilities that the family and the 
whole society should have for mothers who have to carry and take care of their children. 
Solidarity impels us to protect all people and to be a voice for women who are the victims of 
sexism, domestic and sexual abuse, and other social injustices.  
Secondly, Clark contends that solidarity helps us to avoid “any form of collectivism in 
which persons are subsumed by the whole or subverted to it.”245 Cathleen Kaveny argues that 
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individual autonomy is ultimately a social achievement.246 In other words, in the language of 
solidarity, there is no conflict between the good of each individual and that of community.  
Thirdly, by practicing and building the virtue of solidarity, one comes to recognize that 
it is necessary to address the structural problems that human rights and human dignity violate. 
To assure conditions in which all people are able to become more fully human, human rights 
need to be protected and promoted. Because social sins or the structures of vice tend to be 
hidden and protected by both cultural and political powers, it is only in solidarity with the 
victims that one is able to identify those structures of vice and attempt to defeat them.  
c. To be compassionate  
In reality, it is easy to condemn women who have an abortion, but it seems more 
difficult to understand them and be compassionate toward their sufferings and frustrations. 
Clark contends that the true meaning of solidarity is demonstrated when one lets herself be 
changed by others’ pains. She writes: “If your pain cannot change me and my pain cannot 
change you, then the relationship cannot be one of solidarity, even if basic needs are being 
met.”247 She goes on to say that “the virtue of solidarity and the praxis of human rights require 
your pain to change me. Participation in the humanity of one another is necessary.”248 Hence, 
it is important to ask how unjust structures in society have negatively impacted these women, 
and to what extent people are responsible for these injustices. Pope Francis, by being 
compassionate to these women, conceded to all priests the discretion to absolve the sin of 
abortion to those who seek forgiveness for it.249 Following Pope Francis, Cristina Traina further 
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argues that women with unwanted pregnancies do need mercy for their moral failings but this 
mercy is incomplete without the compassionate commitment to address structural justices that 
solidarity implies.250 She opts for a compassion that prophetically condemns and commits itself 
to undoing unjust circumstances that often force pregnant women into genuine moral dilemmas 
that demand repentance and absolution. Her insight shines a particular light on our discussion: 
faced with others’ sufferings, as Catholics we are called not only to be merciful but also to 
involve ourselves in challenging any social and structural justice. In the context of the 
Vietnamese Church, although many Catholic individuals and institutions have been involved 
in the works of mercy, it is essential to understand that, according to CST, in its social and 
charity works, the Church is called not just to take care of victims but also to change the very 
structures that victimize them. Therefore, in my opinion, there is an urgent need for the 
Vietnamese Church to look beyond charitable projects under Church auspices. Thus, the 
Vietnamese Church needs to see if there are ways (maybe through civil society or local 
government) in which Catholics are influencing or could in the future influence social policy 
or nongovernmental efforts not only to “help” the poor but to empower the poor and the 
marginalized, to promote systemic change.   
d. A call to conversion 
As mentioned earlier, the practice of the virtue of solidarity helps one come aware of 
one’s responsibility for the evil consequences of one’s actions in the world. This sense of 
responsibility leads one to conversion, that is, a change of heart and mind, and a new way of 
existing in the world.251 In other words, by the virtue of solidarity, one comes to acknowledge 
that “the sin of one’s suffering is directly related to the sin of another’s active complicity or 
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indifference.”252 This sense of responsibility urges one to act in justice for the sake of the 
common good. A transformation of personal relationships leads to a change of structures at 
large. Along these lines, Dorr contends that “the virtue of solidarity transforms the 
interpersonal relationships of individuals with the persons around them. It causes the more 
powerful to feel responsible for those who are weak and makes them ready to share what they 
have with them.”253 
For Pope John Paul II, the conversion also includes the process of “growing 
awareness”254 that is, a new, critical awareness of the interdependence of a people, groups of 
persons, nations, and continents. The process of conversion includes a raising of awareness, an 
increasingly critical perception of society, and a growing recognition of the structures of sin.255 
At the same time, as Charles E. Curran remarks, “to bring about a more just society, all people 
should recognize the need not only to change structures but also to change hearts.”256 He 
contends that, from a theological perspective, this basic change of heart is very important 
because the primary message of Jesus calls for repentance or change of heart. Without a change 
of heart, there will never be a change of structures. For John Paul II demonstrates, since we are 
a human family, each of us in some way is in solidarity with others. Because we, as members 
of society, benefit from participating in and sustaining unjust social structures that cause harm 
to others, each of us has responsibilities to address these structural evils. Once we recognize 
how structures of sin distort and harm human dignity, each member of the Church has to ask 
for the grace of conversion. Each should ask how we, individually and communally, contribute 
to and maintain social and structural injustices that harm others’ rights and dignity as human 
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beings. This conversion needs to be practiced; for example, in solidarity with the 39 victims 
and as an expression of communal conversion, the Vietnamese Church called all her members 
to fast one day.  
e. A way of peace 
John Paul II proposes solidarity as a path to peace and to development.257 Hence, it is 
hoped that solidarity will lead to the transformation of societal structures through the 
collaboration and participation of all individuals in a community. Consonant with the trend of 
the recent Magisterium, John Paul II refers to a societal change inspired by the spirit of 
pacifism. This also demonstrates that, at the core of solidarity is an ethic of hope – hope in the 
human person and her ability to choose good over evil. John Paul II trusts in the human ability 
to “conquer evil with goodness.”258 Although such an approach might be sometimes “accused 
of being too irenic, too willing to appease rather than accept conflict in the struggle for 
justice,”259 it promotes a hopeful and pacifist way that leads to peace. Doran maintains that, for 
John Paul II, solidarity purifies struggles, ensuring that the struggle for human beings and their 
rights never becomes a struggle of one against another.260 Solidarity does not aim at introducing 
structural change in a violent manner. People trust that if their solidarity is supported by the 
great majority of the population, those who hold power will be forced to resign or negotiate.261 
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4. Some practical and pastoral implications  
a. Social sin and conscience formation 
 The Vietnamese Church needs to be more active in her mission to form the conscience 
of the baptized, which in turn impacts the conscience of society as a whole. The Church fulfills 
this educational mission not only by her teachings but also by her witness. In chapter 1, we 
discovered how people’s conscience may be ignored or blinded by social practices and 
traditions in which they participate. In this situation, Catholic teachings might serve as 
reminders to reflect the moral values that have been forgotten or ignored. In other words, 
Catholic Magisterium enables individuals to recognize the demands of the divine law through 
their conscience.  
Regarding the responsibility of a moral agent, as we explained in chapter 1, it is 
important to be attentive to the communal aspect of conscience; to discuss and to emphasize 
the social dimension of sin call us to acknowledge the social impacts on one’s conscience 
formation. As Cahill rightly points out, “conscience must be formed and educated communally, 
even as the self is also formed in community.”262 As I argued at the outset of this chapter, the 
emphasis on conscience formation of moral theology in the Vietnamese Church still reflect the 
individualistic, act-oriented approach of traditional moral theology. This approach, on the one 
hand, prevents us from realizing mitigating factors that lessen one’s moral responsibility, and, 
on the other hand, neglects a social understanding of sin and fails to address social issues and 
structural injustices. 
However, it is not true that the acknowledgment of the social dimension of sin leads to 
the elimination of all personal responsibility of one’s moral agency. On the one hand, it is 
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necessary to free people from an exaggerated sense of guilt that may lead to sins.263 On the 
other hand, aware of the existence of social sin, each of us is impelled to know that we are 
involved in many situations in which many people suffer because of unjust social structures. 
From the Catholic perspective, this complicity might be a result of direct or indirect 
cooperation in evil but could also be the result of omission or indifference. In many cases, an 
omission or indifference is also a sin against God and our neighbors. Chapter 25 of the Gospel 
of Matthew reminds us that one will be judged based on what the person has done or has not 
done for others who are images of Jesus Christ, the incarnate God. Julie Hanlon Rubio contends 
that, once one begins to see how we are all involved, one can slowly make way into broader 
understandings not only of a person’s innocence but of complicity.264 In my opinion, it is 
important to keep ourselves in a dynamic tension between guilt and responsibility. By living 
in the tension between these two poles, I opt for a conscience formation that includes the 
integral development of moral character suggested by Gula in light of virtue ethics in which 
the virtue of prudence and solidarity play a vital role.265 A mature conscience requires that a 
moral agent must be fully aware of the cause and effect of what she is doing. Therefore, 
conscience formation aims to assist women and men in making decisions based on their own 
mature independence and responsibility. 
In solidarity with the poor and the marginalized, one’s conscience will be awakened. I 
contend that, in solidarity with the victims, by letting ourselves be touched by others’ pains, 
our indifference will be overcome. Bryan Massingale argues that, by using racism as a case 
study and by indicating the defects of two traditional approaches in conscience formation 
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represented by Karl Peschke and Richard Gula, neither approach is adequate to the challenges 
raised by the reality of nonconscious racial bias.266 Inspired by Joseph Feagin’s insights, 
Massingale opts for a compassionate discomfort that would enable “consciences to overcome, 
or at least struggle against, culturally induced ethical blindness and indifference.”267 Here, 
Massingale rightly points out the vital role solidarity plays in conscience formation. I strongly 
agree with him that this approach overcomes the limits of the traditional approaches of 
conscience formation that have ignored, or at least taken lightly, the social dimension of 
conscience. 
b. The role of the Christian community 
To be realistic, the Vietnamese Church should be a creative minority working for what 
is truly the human good in her society. For a particular political situation, it is too optimistic 
for the Church to attempt to change society by getting involved in social and political spheres. 
I tend to be sympathetic to Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger’s view, that is, that the Church’s role is 
to be true to herself.268 She is not first and foremost a means for social progress; nor should the 
Church try to justify herself by her deeds of working for social reform.269  
My proposals are also supported by more recent theological approaches that appeal to 
a local or perspective from below. In an attempt to propose a revised definition for the concept 
of the structure of sin by connecting the definition with moral psychology, Conor Kelly 
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maintains that “structures of sin do not need to be changed at the highest systemic levels,”270 
rather, “the strongest impacts on moral intuitions will come from the closest groups; combating 
the power of structural sin, then, can begin at the local level.”271 In a slightly different way, 
aware of the limited contribution of all Christians to serious social problems at the macro level, 
Rubio strongly appeals to another approach that encourages social change “less from above 
than from below.”272 Rubio’s proposal reflects a diversity of ways of working for social reform 
suggested by CST before and after the Second Vatican Council.  
As a Christian community, we are called to protect the life of an unborn child and the 
mother as well. Rubio rightly points out that the key to finding a credible answer lies in 
recognizing why women have abortions.273 We recognize that, as we discussed in chapters 
1and 2, choosing to have an abortion is not an easy decision and at times is tragic for many 
women. For that reason, besides addressing unjust structures that violate the right of an unborn 
child, it is essential to be compassionate and in solidarity with those women who are victims 
of domestic violence, crime, and sexual abuse. As Bilgrien writes, “If someone is suffering, it 
is a sign that solidarity is not being practiced.”274 It is important to understand how difficult 
and tragic it is for a woman who wants to keep her child but cannot do that due to the pressure 
of the family or society, or the suffering a woman faces when she must abort her unborn child 
due in part to her partner abandoning her and she cannot afford her own life on her own. 
We discover that “women with unwanted pregnancies almost inevitably experience 
moral failure: they must compromise or ignore real, mutually exclusive moral obligations, 
whether they give birth and parent, give birth and give up custody, or seek abortions. This 
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moral failure causes moral harm as well.”275 In my pastoral ministry, I have encountered 
women who suffered from their tragic experiences of abortion, both psychologically and 
spiritually. For this reason, beyond proclaiming the mercy of God through the sacrament of 
reconciliation as Pope Francis suggested, there is an urgent need for counsel, accompaniment, 
care, and love for these women. This assistance is almost entirely missing in the medical 
systems in Vietnam.276 In response to this urgent need, some religious orders attempted to 
establish pastoral and psychological counseling centers where the young can find support, 
guidance, accompaniment, and even solutions for their issues. These initiatives are still very 
limited, however, and they should be an apostolic priority for some religious orders in their 
apostolic discernment.  
Furthermore, the Church needs to establish good pastoral care that seeks a feasible way 
to help people to turn away from abortion. We should acknowledge that the Church’s mission 
to protect life cannot be separated from the issue of supporting women and caring for children. 
In order to make this mission more effective, Church leaders must sufficiently address the 
causes that lead women to abortion and search for solutions. This implies that the Church at 
times must name unjust social customs and evil structures that suppress the integral 
development of human beings. Christopher Pramuk highlights the Church’s responsibility to 
“effect positive transformation in society,” not only because of our rich theological resources, 
but particularly because we “profess a commitment to human dignity and justice.”277 Baum 
rightly points out that it is the task of the Church “to make people aware of the obstacles that 
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prevented them from exercising responsibility for their own lives.”278 At the same time, 
Catholic leaders ought to engage actively in cooperation with government, communal, and 
social services to find ways to promote a better life for mothers and families, and particularly 
affordable, qualify care for children.  
The Church is able to change the world step by step because of the witness of the people 
of God. For example, in the mission of protecting and promoting the culture of life, many 
individuals and agencies, especially female religious congregations, establish and run many 
“receiving homes” in which they welcome, take care of, and help young women with unwanted 
pregnancies. Another example: a Catholic priest, Dong Nguyen, built a cemetery for aborted 
fetuses.279 His aim in doing this is twofold: first, to express compassion and respect toward 
these unfortunate fetuses and, second, to remind young people and the parents to reflect on the 
values of life. Moreover, although some Catholic religious institutions are involved in taking 
care of the young women who experience unwanted pregnancies, I think that they should be 
more active in this mission. The importance of these engagements does not consist only in 
preventing young women from choosing to terminate their pregnancies. More than that, these 
activities should become a prophetic sign of a culture of life that the Church unceasingly 
promotes in a world which wants to support a culture of death. For Catholic doctors, 
pharmacists, nurses, and chaplains, their profession calls them to be guardians and servants of 
human life.280 They have to become witnesses of the Gospel of life in their own lives and 
workplaces.  
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c. Law and public policy  
It is not realistic to presume we can eliminate the legalization of  abortion, especially 
in Vietnam’s social and political situation. The experience from Vietnam and many other 
countries has demonstrated that “women who want abortions will find a way to obtain them.”281 
That being said, it is necessary to rethink the language used in the current population law and 
to address public policies that support and promote traditional values of family and a better life 
for mothers and children.  
Firstly, the government and lawmakers need to be more attentive to the language used 
in current population law. Here, the key passage that Thomas Aquinas quotes from Isidore of 
Seville is valuable for us: “Law shall be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the 
custom of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly expressed, lest by 
its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed for no private benefit but for the common 
good.”282 This quote articulates the range of qualities that good law must demonstrate. The last 
part of the statement clearly affirms that the law needs to be clear in its content and expression. 
Obscure and ambiguous terms and expressions need to be eliminated or changed appropriately. 
The requirement that the law be “according to the custom of the country” indicates that 
government officials should not use laws as a tool to implement their own vision of the perfect 
community, without any regard for the particular practices to which their subjects have become 
accustomed in living their lives.283 Finally, inspired by Aquinas’s realistic definition of law, 
Cathleen Kaveny sees law as a teacher of virtue that is ultimately more respectful of the dignity 
of the law’s subjects than the “law as police officer” approach.284 Kaveny argues that Aquinas 
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maintains that the aim of the law is to lead persons to virtue, to a state of flourishing.285 Kaveny 
finds “ample evidence of how law can still function as a powerful moral teacher by holding up 
a compelling, integrated vision of our common life that inspires people to move beyond its 
strict requirements.”286 This insight shines a light on the situation in Vietnam where the 
language of virtue, not law, has been deeply rooted in the culture and tradition of the country. 
Lawmakers need to be attentive to the pedagogical dimension of law.  
Secondly, the language of rights has its own strength and significance, and in the future, 
Vietnamese theological morality should appeal to it as a synergic force. Yet, under the 
dictatorship of the communist government, the language of rights seems to be less effective, 
and more “political,”287 hence riskier than the language of virtues. In this regard, the insight of 
Daniel Daly about the structure of virtue and structure of vice built up in the concept of virtuous 
dimension of law in Kaveny’s sense is very relevant for the Vietnamese situation.288 On the 
one hand, this approach is supported by Vietnamese cultural and traditional values that have 
been deeply assimilated into the language of virtue and, on the other hand, such an approach 
avoids the risk of being identified as a political action. 
Thirdly, there is an urgent need for governments in seeking public policies to support 
parents and children. The goal of a high-quality life is not attainable just by attempting to 
control the increase of the population. To attain sustainable development for each individual 
and the whole country, the government needs to reform public policies so that human dignity 
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and human rights are protected and promoted, especially those of women, children, and the 
elderly. For example, some scholars argue that, because the government’s free medical care 
for the poor and the elderly is provided in a very limited way, the elderly traditionally must 
rely on their sons. This social structural defect may lead to a preference for having a male-
child.289 Moreover, to counteract sexism, the government needs to provide better education for 
women and more employment opportunities by which women’s dignity and status are 
recognized, protected, and promoted. Finally, in the cultural and traditional context, the voice 
of women has not been listened to in many realms of social life. We should bring women’s 
needs, interests, and experiences into these debates and make their wellbeing the focus of 
policies aimed at tackling sex-selective abortion. For example, the silence surrounding sex-
selective abortion remains a major challenge for individuals and society.  
In short, this chapter pointed out how it is possible and fruitful to utilize the resources 
of the Thomistic tradition on virtue to elucidate solidarity as a virtue. Solidarity, from a 
Thomistic perspective, is a moral, personal, and social virtue that needs to be exercised and 
built up in community life. By exercising the virtue of solidarity, we are able to become more 
fully human, more fully who we are. In solidarity with others, by entering into the chaos of 
others, we grow in the capacity to love and accept others. By letting others’ pain change our 
hearts and minds, we are able to understand, to be compassionate, and to act to eliminate all 
evils that cause these harms. In line with Clark, Hollenbach, and others, I contend that in SRS, 
although solidarity is a virtue that inclines us to good relations with others and service to the 
common good, in one way or another, it is more personal, affective, and intimate than justice.290 
Moreover, as a social virtue, solidarity is closely linked to justice; however, it surpasses the 
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demands of justice in order to find a better life condition for others. In my view, the virtue of 
solidarity needs to be accompanied by other virtues such as justice, fortitude, and charity. For 
example, in Centesimus Annus, John Paul II implicitly links the virtue of fortitude with 
solidarity when he contends that  “only such an awareness can give the courage needed to face 
the risk and the change involved in every authentic attempt to come to the aid of another.”291  
Moreover, as noted above, solidarity may be found and appreciated in many different 
cultures and traditions. This confirmation opens the possibility of collaboration and dialogue 
between Catholics and all people of good will. All human beings are called to work for the 
common good because we all share a common humanity. Doran rightly contends that “dialogue 
and participation are undertaken, in solidarity, on the basis that to be an ‘other’ person is good, 
and to be and act with the ‘other’ adds to the total of goodness.”292  
In my view, the virtue of solidarity is a good way to address personal and social moral 
problems in Vietnam. The language of virtue is deeply rooted in the Vietnamese tradition and 
culture. In addition, in the long course of its history, many narratives fostered the spirit of 
solidarity in this country. The question is how to rediscover the value and meaning of narratives 
in Vietnamese culture that encourage this virtue. As our study has pointed out, in order to build 
a culture that cultivates and promotes the virtue of solidarity, it is essential to promote and 
protect human rights, to help each to realize that we share a common humanity. Building 
solidarity and practicing human rights requires seeing the people in front of me first. Solidarity 
and human rights are realized through human encounters and not in the abstract.  
                                                        
291 John Paul II, Centesimus Annus (1991), no. 58; cf. Bilgrien, Solidarity, 149. 
292 Doran, Solidarity, 242. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is of great importance to address a moral problem such as abortion in 
Vietnam. Indeed, this evil not only deprives the life of an innocent child but also does harm to 
the moral agency of women who suffered from their tragic experiences of abortion, both 
psychologically and spiritually. Our analysis also demonstrates that the origin of this issue is 
complicated and multifaceted, both personally and structurally. This reality demands that we 
address the problem from a broader perspective. Therefore, being faithful to her mission of 
protection of life, the Vietnamese church, beyond proclaiming the gospel of life indefatigably 
and showing her merciful love and care for women who have abortions, needs to address social 
and structural issues that play a vital role in this picture.  
To fulfill this mission, in the spirit of the virtue of solidarity, it is necessary to gather 
the strengths of all people of goodwill. For this reason, within Vietnam, it is important to 
promote the culture of encounter and collaboration among all people. As we pointed above, 
the virtue of solidarity is deeply rooted in the Vietnamese tradition and culture. Moreover, 
dialogue is needed and it requires the virtues of faith, courage, humility, respect, and charity. 
Through such a dialogue, the Church can understand, learn, and collaborate with people of 
other religions. This should be a hallmark of Catholic social teaching, now and in the future. It 
also is important to learn how to collaborate between Catholics and Christians of other 
denominations. In Vietnam, Christians who belong to other denominations are still a very 
minor group and at times they have struggled with Catholics over misunderstandings that come 
from both sides.  
Finally, our analysis also leads us to question the application of Catholic social teaching 
(CST) in the Vietnamese church. Clearly, CST has strongly encouraged Christians to be 
involved in social and political transformation. Unfortunately, this mission cannot equally 
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succeed in every corner of the world. From the outset, we noticed that Catholic social teaching 
is still alienated in the Vietnamese context due to the complicated sociopolitical situation and 
the particular focus of moral formation both in seminaries and schools of theology. Due to 
these limits, other questions emerge and they should be addressed in future projects: Why has 
CST remained on the margins of theological discourses and training in the Vietnamese Church? 
Has it been so because the Catholic church in Vietnam has not attempted to implement CST in 
the local church or because the Vietnamese church finds that CST is, in some ways, irrelevant 
to the particular situation in Vietnam? I think both possibilities are partly true. These questions 
call us to consider the need for updating and inculturating Catholic social teaching. It is clear 
that Catholic social teaching, in other parts of the world, from the outset has created a robust, 
active, and fruitful participation of Christians in social and political spheres. By considering 
the diversity of social, political, and economic realities in different countries further 
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